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modern language notes

VOL. LXXIII, NO. 7, NOVEMBER 1958

Spenser's *Letter to Raleigh*

It is ironic that the *Letter to Raleigh* which Spenser annexed to the 1590 edition of *The Faerie Queene* "for that it giueth great light to the Reader, for the better vnderstanding" should have become such an obstacle to understanding his poem. It is generally agreed that there are divergencies between the *Letter* and the poem, especially in what is given as the occasion of the Knights' quests. Miss Spens writes: "we have . . . three Books wholly and one partially written before, and two after, the Preface [i. e. the *Letter*]; and only one of the first four is consistent with it." Mrs. Bennett claims that the *Letter* "not only misrepresents the general theme and emphasis of the poem but it also misrepresents the subject matter of two out of the first three books." W. J. B. Owen concludes that "the letter is all but irrelevant to the structure of the present poem."¹ But if the

¹ Janet Spens, *Spenser's Faerie Queene* (London, 1934), p. 16. J. W. Bennett, *The Evolution of "The Faerie Queene"* (Chicago, 1942), p. 30. W. J. B. Owen, "The Structure of *The Faerie Queene*," *PMLA*, LXVIII (1953), p. 1080. Cf. his "A Spenser Note," *MLR*, XLIII (1948), 239-241; and his "Spenser's *Letter to Raleigh*," *MLR*, XLV (1950), 511-512. The "divergencies" between the *Letter* and the poem went unnoticed, even by Upton and Todd, until 1932 when Lawrence Blair first pointed them out. ("The Plot of the *Faerie Queene*," *PMLA*, XLVII, 81-88.) He concluded simply: "Spenser did not tell the truth about his plot when he wrote to Raleigh." In reply, R. H.

Letter is so at variance with the poem, as these critics suggest, one must infer that Spenser deliberately misrepresents what he wrote. Since such an inference is so unreasonable, some critics assume that the *Letter* describes an earlier plan which was modified during the actual writing. Yet its date, 23 Jan. 1589 [90], shows that it was written just before the poem was published; and its presence in the 1590 edition would still involve deliberate misrepresentation. Does it attempt to rationalize what was being published? but how odd to rationalize a poem by misrepresenting it. Does it offer, as a recent critic suggests, a new plan proposed by Raleigh but not carried beyond Book I? but how much more odd that Spenser, having spent ten years planning and writing, should attempt such drastic revision of his poem while it was being printed. Or is the *Letter* simply irrelevant to our reading the poem?² Such ways out are tempting, but none is satisfactory.

What Spenser chooses to tell us in the *Letter*—and also not to tell us—is puzzling until we understand its relation to the poem. The first part in which he defines and defends the method of the poet who offers fiction rather than affirms discipline suggests that he is addressing a middle-class audience. For such readers he must underline his purpose and the didactic end of his poem, and justify his choice of the history of Arthur. Then he goes on to describe his method, and to outline the disposition of his History according to the method of the “poet historical.” (One indication of Spenser’s careful writing here is the almost equal space he gives to the definition, defence, description, and disposition of his method.) His account of the poem’s structure is deliberately formalized: the twelve knights as patrons of the twelve virtues set out on the twelve days of the Faery Queen’s feast “vppon which xii. seuerall dayes, the occasions of the

Perkinson accused him of making an “astonishing error” through not reading the *Letter* more carefully. (“The Plot of *The Faerie Queene*,” *PMLA*, XLVIII (1933), p. 295.) Blair then retracted his error (*ibid.*, p. 298); but the heresy had been sown.

² These speculations are made by Owen (in the articles cited in ftn. 1), or by Mrs. Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 242. Owen grants that “the presence of the letter in the 1590 edition is all the more remarkable since Spenser had an opportunity to revise or remove it when he prepared the cancel signed Qq in the second issue of the book.” (“In These XII Books Severally Handled and Discoursed,” in *That Soueraine Light*, ed. W. R. Mueller & D. C. Allen (Baltimore, 1952), p. 85, ftn. 1. However, since he believes that “we are observing the difficulties of a literary theorist who, for the moment and for whatever reason, is sadly muddled,” he concludes: “to devise schemes to help the poet out of his difficulty is to assume that he himself knew what he meant” (*ibid.*, p. 88). It is not Spenser who is sadly muddled.

xii. seuerall aduentures hapned, which being vndertaken by xii. seuerall knights, are in these xii books seuerally handled and discoursed." From the last phrase it is clear that the poem's structure is not repetitive: the adventures are "seuerally [that is, differently] handled and discoursed." But in a preface which serves to introduce the poem, Spenser need not describe, what can only be given in the poem itself, how they are differently handled. Thus the *Letter* suggests the parallel structure of Books I and II while the poem works out that parallel in terms of significant contrast.³ Again, Spenser may speak of the various knights as patrons of the twelve virtues "as Aristotle hath deuised," without adding what is well-known: that while Temperance is a specifically Aristotelian virtue, Holiness is purely Christian. He tells only enough to arouse, but not to satisfy, curiosity; and he need not, were such possible, tell all. It is sufficient that he declare his purpose in order to avoid "gealous opinions and misconstructions," and that he outline the pattern of his history which will not then seem "tedious and confused."⁴ To use his own phrase, he directs our understanding "to the wel-head of the History," rather than to that History itself. For Spenser that "wel-head" is a formalized pattern or argument, rather than a narrative summary or digest of his poem. It follows that the reader should not expect the *Letter* to provide more than a pattern or schematic form which the poet will embody in the poem.

Yet what of the account which Spenser offers of the occasion of Book II? Is there a "discrepancy" here with the poem? There is—but only if we insist that the *Letter* paraphrase the "content" of the poem. Instead, Spenser presents the occasion of Book II in deliberately schematic terms which are adequate for the first three Books. A witness who suffers directly from some wrong complains to the Faery Queen: Una complains that her parents are besieged by a Dragon, the bloody-handed Babe is presented by the Palmer who complains in his stead that its parents have been slain by Acrasia, and the Groom complains that his Lady is held captive by Busirane. This account

³ See A. S. P. Woodhouse, "Nature and Grace in *The Faerie Queene*," *ELH*, xvi (1949), 194-228; and also my "'Like race to runne': the Parallel Structure of *The Faerie Queene*, Books I and II," forthcoming in *PMLA*.

⁴ The absence of the *Letter* from the 1596 edition of the six Books has provoked speculation that Spenser's plans had changed. (See Owen, in *MLR*, xlv (1950), p. 512, and Mrs. Bennett, p. 37.) But it is a sufficient explanation that by 1596 Spenser had no reason to fear "gealous opinions and misconstructions." Since the *Letter* is intended only to give light to the reader, the poem in six Books offers all the light needed.

is presented as an allegorical pageant which provides the pattern for the knights' quests which follow. Only later in the poem do we see how this pattern is achieved: that Truth laments man's spiritual bondage signified by the imprisonment of Una's parents, Adam and Eve, within the brazen Castle which is the brazen body of the Dragon, and how the Redcross knight slays the Dragon to release mankind who then may enter the unfallen Eden. And that Reason (the presence of Truth in man's nature) laments man's fleshly bondage signified by the Babe's bloody hands, and how Guyon destroys Acrasia's Bower to release Verdant, who is mankind, from bondage to the fallen Eden. But all this is rightly withheld from the *Letter*. The schematic nature of Spenser's statement is also seen in the "time" sequence: the knights are said to leave on twelve successive days, while in the poem a knight begins his quest only when his predecessor has completed the quest assigned him. Finally, this schematic account illustrates, as the context shows, the difference in method between the historiographer and the poet. The former "discourseth of affayres orderly as they were donne, *accounting as well the times as the actions*" (my italics), while the latter "thrusteth into the middest, euen where it most concerneth him, and there recouring to the thinges forepaste, and diuining of thinges to come, maketh a pleasing Analysis of all." While the historiographer must present the occasion of Guyon's adventure as given in the *Letter*, Spenser is free to recreate the time and the action as his allegory demands. He omits the occasion of Book I—it merely supplements the matter of the poem—in order to reveal the knight at the beginning of his quest already transformed by his borrowed armour, one appointed to the service of the Faery Queen, "to winne him worship, and her grace to haue." The account of "a tall clownishe younge man [who] . . . rested him on the floore, vnfitte through his rusticity for a better place" balances the final vision which the poem projects of Saint George dwelling in the New Jerusalem. After describing the occasion of Guyon's quest, Spenser adds: "which is the beginning of the second booke," the beginning, that is, for the historiographer. The allegory of Book II requires that the action begin *in medias res*. The Book opens with Archimago in power, and the parents already slain by Acrasia. Into this fallen world Guyon enters to take the quest upon himself, as a self-appointed act of vengeance on behalf of mankind. Unlike the Redcross knight, he is (so Archimago addresses him) the "faire sonne of Mars, that seeke with warlike spoile, / And great atchieu'ments great your selfe to

make." The simple allegorical pageant given in the *Letter* is quite properly displaced by the poem's pleasing analysis.

If the *Letter* is properly read, I would claim that there are no divergencies with the poem. Instead of remaining an obstacle between the reader and the poem, it should give "great light to the Reader, for the better vnderstanding," as Spenser intended.

University of Washington

A. C. HAMILTON

The Colors of Fancy: An Image Cluster in Pope

In a letter to Henry Cromwell (November 12, 1711), Pope spells out the meaning of a cluster of images that was to reappear significantly in his poetry throughout his career. He is discussing the Muses:

Those Aerial Ladies just discover to me enough of their Beauties to urge my Pursuit, and draw me on in a wandring Maze of Thought, still in hopes (& only in hopes) of attaining those favors from 'em, which they confer on their more happy admirers elsewhere. We grasp some more beautifull Idea in our Brain, than our Endeavors to express it can set to the view of others; & still do but labour to fall short of our first Imagination. The *gay Colouring* which *Fancy* gave to our Design at the first *transient* glance we had of it, goes off in the Execution; like those *various Figures* in the *gilded Clouds*, which while we gaze long upon, to sepearate the Parts of each imaginary Image, the whole *faints before the Eye, & decays* into Confusion.¹

The idea of a gap between design and execution is scarcely original, and we may find the youthful epistolary elegance rather amusing; but Pope transfigures this commonplace idea in some of his finest poetic passages.

He had in fact used the cluster before this letter spelled out its significance in such detail: first in the *Pastorals* (1704?), to describe nature's response to the death of Daphne—"Tis done, and nature's *various* charms *decay*, / See gloomy *clouds* obscure the cheerful day!" (*Winter*, 27-30)—and then, much more clearly and elaborately, in the *Essay on Criticism* (1707?):

So when the faithful pencil has design'd
Some bright Idea of the master's mind,

¹The *Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, ed. George Sherburn (Oxford, 1956), I, p. 135. (Italics in quotations from Pope are my own throughout.)

Where a new world leaps out at his command,
 And ready Nature waits upon his hand;
 When the ripe colours soften and unite,
 And sweetly melt into just shade and light;
 When mellowing years their full perfection give,
 And each bold figure just begins to live,
 The *treach'rous colours* the fair art betray,
 And all the *bright creation fades away!* (484-493)

Here the imagery has a somewhat different point from that expounded in the Cromwell letter. Pope illustrates the tragic effect of time on the works of man by citing the brief duration of great paintings before their colors fade; and a possible ambiguity in "creation" (human art or the divinely patterned reality?) hints at an even sadder idea, that it may be the painter himself who fails to survive, dying just as his powers have reached their height.

Pope used the cluster of "fancy-dream-colour-various-gold-cloud-decay" for a number of purposes, ranging from simple description, in *The Temple of Fame* (1711?)—"Now a clear Sun the shining Scene displays, / The *transient* Landscape now in *Clouds decays*" (19-20)—to serious moral commentary (*An Essay on Man*: 1731):

Mean-while Opinion *gilds* with *varying rays*
 Those *painted clouds* that beautify our days;
 Each want of Happiness by Hope supply'd,
 And each vacuity of sense by Pride (II. 283-286)

and the various shadings of ironic tone:

On *painted* Cielings you devoutly stare,
 Where sprawl the Saints of Verrio or Laguerre,
 On *gilded clouds* in fair expansion lie,
 And bring all Paradise before your eye. (1731:
Moral Essay IV 145-148)

Come then, the *colours* and the ground prepare!
 Dip in the *Rainbow*, trick her off in *Air*,
 Chuse a firm *Cloud*, *before it fall*, and in it
 Catch, *ere she change*, the Cynthia of this minute.
 (1734: *Moral Essay III* 17-20)

Though the shades of feeling vary, the emphasis is always on the delusive and impermanent nature of the fancy and its "painting." Pope could, to be sure, use the cluster in *The Rape of the Lock* (1714) to express admiration for the sylphs and their marvelous elemental beauty:

. . . Dipt in the richest *Tincture* of the Skies,
Where Light disports in ever-mingling *Dies*,
While ev'ry Beam new *transient Colours* flings,
Colours that change whene'er they wave their Wings. (II. 65-68)

But such admiration is precarious, balanced as it is against an understanding of how little such a beautiful fancy accords with the actual state of things; and Pope ends, in *The New Dunciad* (1742), by using the sylphs' imagery of delicate evanescence to express bitter scorn for the inconstancy of human allegiances:

On others Int'rest her gay liv'ry flings,
Int'rest, that *waves* on *Party-colour'd* wings:
Turn'd to the Sun, she casts a thousand *dyes*,
And, as she turns, the *colours fall or rise*. (*Dunciad* IV. 537-540)

The *Dunciad*, with its elaborate concern for light and darkness and the distortions of warped imagination, gives the imagery hard use. Dulness, the "cloud-compelling Queen," beholds her creatures through distorting mists and fogs:

She, *tinsel'd* o'er in robes of *varying hues*,
With self-applause her *wild creation* views;
Sees *momentary* monsters *rise and fall*,
And with her own *fools-colours* *gilds* them all. (I. 81-84)

When Curll, victorious at the "heroic" games, reaches out to grasp his prize, the phantom poet Dulness has shaped out of air: "A *shapeless shade*, it *melted* from his sight, / Like *forms in clouds*, or *visions of the night*" (II. 111-112); and Tibbald's trance (III. 5-10), in which "raptures high the seat of sense o'erflow," leads him into the fanciful world of "the Fool's paradise, the Statesman's scheme, / The *air-built* Castle, and the *golden Dream*." Dulness subsists in a world of delusion and distortion, a world to which Swift had already paid his ironic respects in terms very similar to Pope's: "How fading and insipid do all objects accost us, that are not conveyed in the vehicle of delusion! How shrunk is everything, as it appears in the glass of nature! So that if it were not for the assistance of artificial mediums, false lights, refracted angles, varnish, and tinsel, there would be a mighty level in the felicity and enjoyments of mortal men." (*Tale of a Tub*, IX.)

The uses of the imagery in the 1728 *Dunciad* made the introduction of the passage on "Int'rest" (quoted above) in 1742 more effective; and they prepared for the most powerful and dramatic use Pope ever

found for the cluster, in the great conclusion to the revised version of the poem (1743):

She comes! she comes! the sable Throne behold
Of Night Primæval, and of Chaos old!
Before her, *Fancy's gilded clouds decay,*
And all its *varying Rain-bows die away.* (IV. 629-632)

The imagery assumes an almost tragic shading—the death of fancy is finally seen as being implicated in the death of all human functions and values, as the mind and its activities, even such marginal ones as fancy, yield to delusion and mindlessness.²

This cluster of images of course leads us back to the great seventeenth-century discussion of the reliability of “fancy” as an instrument of knowledge. The Hobbesian definition of imagination as decaying sense (*Leviathan*, Pt. I, ch. 2) comes immediately to mind; and the whole problem of “primary” and “secondary” qualities underlies this passage from *Moral Essay I* (1733):

. . . the difference is as great between
The optics seeing, as the objects seen.
All Manners take a *tincture* from our own,
Or come *discolour'd* thro' our Passions shown.
Or *Fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies,*
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand *dyes.* (19-28)

The imagery here enables Pope to bridge the gap between epistemology and ethics in a fairly persuasive way; but in the main the cluster functions not philosophically but imaginatively. If we try to deduce Pope's views of the function and power of fancy from his uses of these images, the result is a jumble; he approaches the figures not as speculative thinker but as poet—their usefulness is determined by the needs of the particular poetic context and not by their possible place in a formal theory of knowledge or rhetoric. The colors in the clouds may be beautiful, pathetic, foolish, depending on the quality of the human experience the poem is treating. In the hands of a great poet, the images and their associations unite to compose a flexible symbol for a rich variety of feelings and imaginative situations.

² For other occurrences of the cluster, see *The Fourth Satire of Donne Versified* (1713? 1733?), vss. 184-189; *The First Ode of the Fourth Book of Horace* (1736?), vss. 41-44. The former is especially interesting; Pope transforms Donne's simple “a Trance / Like his, who dream't he saw hell, did advance / It self o're me” into “There sober Thought pursu'd th' amusing theme / Till *Fancy colour'd it, and form'd a Dream.*”

One might even suggest that we have an example, on a small scale, of one of the essential qualities of neo-classic art. The cluster is in a sense formulaic, like the Homeric epithet or the Old English *kenning*; Pope has it at hand when he needs it, when the poetic context requires a handy emblem for the beautiful impermanence of experience, or for the human folly that believes the impermanent to be eternal. The formulaic quality, however, does not serve the lazy purposes of mechanical writing. Each context transforms the imagery, puts it to new work to suit the momentary requirements of Pope's art. In this mediation between formula and local imaginative transformation we may see in miniature the tension between "convention" and "originality" that gives neo-classic literary art its peculiar power and interest.

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THOMAS R. EDWARDS, JR.

A Melville Debt to Carlyle

One of the very short chapters in *Moby Dick*, "The Funeral," Chapter 69, presents graphically, and then speculatively, the casting loose of the "peeled white body of the beheaded whale" from the side of the whaleship. "Haul in the chains! Let the carcass go astern!" Slowly it floats away: a "vast white headless phantom." Melville invites his reader to see the funeral guests—the swarming "sea-vultures" and "air-sharks all punctiliously in black or speckled"—and then returns to his ghost theme:

Nor is this the end. Desecrated as the body is, a vengeful ghost survives and hovers over it to scare. Espied by some timid man-of-war or blundering discovery-vessel from afar, when the distance obscuring the swarming fowls nevertheless still shows the white mass floating in the sun, and the white spray heaving high against it; straightway the whale's unharmed corpse, with trembling fingers is set down in the log—*shoals, rocks, and breakers hereabouts: beware!* And for years afterwards, perhaps, ships shun the place; leaping over it as silly sheep leap over a vacuum, because their leader originally leaped there when a stick was held. There's your law of precedents; there's your utility of traditions; there's the story of your obstinate survival of old beliefs never bottomed on the earth, and now not even hovering in the air! There's orthodoxy! . . .

Are you a believer in ghosts, my friend? There are other ghosts than the Cock-Lane one, and far deeper men than Doctor Johnson who believe in them.

The reference to the Cock Lane ghost has been correctly related by Melville's editors to the London sight-seeing recorded in Melville's *Journal* (November, 1849), to his purchase of Boswell's *Life of Samuel Johnson* (December, 1849), and to Carlyle's reference to the same ghost in Book III, Chapter 8 of *Sartor Resartus* (borrowed from Duyckinck in the summer of 1850).¹ But the debt to Carlyle, who made so much of Doctor Johnson in all of his writings, and who in turn figured so largely in the undertaking of *Moby Dick*, is much more specific. The figure of the sheep in "The Funeral" ("as silly sheep leap over a vacuum, because their leader originally leaped there when a stick was held") is taken directly from Carlyle, and, aptly enough, from his essay on "Boswell's Life of Johnson":

Touching it is, as every herdsman will inform you, with what chivalrous devotedness these woolly Hosts adhere to their Wether; and rush after him, through good report and through bad report, were it into safe shelters and green thymy nooks, or into asphaltic lakes and the jaws of devouring lions. Ever also must we recall that fact which we owe Jean Paul's quick eye: 'If you hold a stick before the Wether, so that he, by necessity, leaps in passing you, and then withdraw your stick, the Flock will nevertheless all leap as he did; and the thousandth sheep shall be found impetuously vaulting over air, as the first did over an otherwise impassable barrier.' Reader, wouldst thou understand Society, ponder well those ovine proceedings; thou wilt find them all curiously significant.²

We note that where Carlyle turns from the sheep to address, in the second person, his "Reader," Melville similarly turns to address "my friend." Nor is Melville wholly original in passing from whales to sheep. For the immediately preceding paragraph in the Carlyle essay closes with a note on biography under this figure of the fishery:

Mankind sail their Life-voyage in huge fleets, following some single whale-fishing or herring-fishing Commodore: the log-book of each differs not, in essential purport, from that of any other; nay the most have no legible log-book (reflection, observation not being among their talents); keep no reckoning, only *keep in sight* of the flagship,—and fish. Read the Commodore's Papers,

¹ Explanatory Notes in *Moby Dick*, Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent, eds. (New York, 1952), p. 760. "The Funeral" is found on pp. 307-308 of this edition.

² *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays* (Philadelphia, 1846), p. 325. (An additional title page reads, "The Modern British Essayists./Vol. V./Thomas Carlyle./Philadelphia:/Carey and Hart./1846.") I have been unable to trace Carlyle's acknowledgment in Jean Paul Richter.

(know his Life); and even your lover of that street Biography will have learned the most of what he sought after.

Carlyle also used the language of herring and whales, fleets and commodores, in *Sartor Resartus*, Book II, Chapter 5.³

An account preserved in the Harvard College Library indicates that Melville purchased in February, 1849, through John Wiley, a set of *Modern British Essayists*. This set has been tentatively identified as that published by Carey and Hart of Philadelphia in the forties, of which Volume V was *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, by Thomas Carlyle.⁴ The borrowing in *Moby Dick* nicely illustrates Melville's process of composition and reemphasizes the significance of Carlyle for his work: it also allows us to add, in some confidence, the *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays* to the list of reading Melville made use of, and suggests a closer examination of these essays as a source for his notions of continental philosophy, Goethe and Voltaire, and all the lesser personalities whom Carlyle introduced in extravagant terms to the writers of England and America.

Harvard University

ALEXANDER WELSH

Classical Echoes in Hopkins' "Heaven-Haven"

The nun's vision of eternal rest in Gerard Manley Hopkins' often anthologized poem, "Heaven-Haven," is clearly reminiscent of Homer's description of the Elysian Plain in the fourth book of the *Odyssey*:

οὐ νιφετός, οὐτ' ἄρ' χειμῶν πολλὸς οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρος,
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ Ζεφύροιο λιγὺ πνείοντος ἀήτας
Ἵκεαρδὸς ἀνέσιν ἀναψύχειν ἀνθρώπους· (IV, 566-568)¹

As an accomplished classical scholar, Hopkins was undoubtedly in-

³ "Boswell's Life of Johnson" was written, and published in *Fraser's Magazine* (1832), while Carlyle was seeking a publisher for *Sartor*.

⁴ Merton M. Sealts, *Melville's Reading: A Check List of Books Owned and Borrowed* (Cambridge, 1948-50: offprinted from *Harvard Library Bulletin*), No. 359.

¹ The Loeb translation by A. T. Murray reads:

No snow is there, nor heavy storm, nor
ever rain, but ever does Ocean send up
blasts of the shrill-blowing West Wind
that they may give cooling to men.

fluenced directly by the passage in Homer, but he could also have found versions of it in the work of his Victorian contemporaries, for both Tennyson and Swinburne closely imitated the Homeric original.²

None of the numerous other poetical references to Elysium in classical literature which are themselves derived from Homer are as close to Hopkins' description as the lines in the *Odyssey*, though the detail of "a few lilies" may have been suggested by Pindar's addition of golden flowers growing on both land and water to his picture of the islands of the blest in the Second Olympian Ode.

But the obvious difference between Pindar's realistic touch and Hopkins' religious symbolism leads toward the real relevance of the classical echo as it operates in Hopkins' poem. Our recognition of the Homeric parallel is important only as we sense the tension established by the contrast between classical pagan and Catholic Christian concepts of the ideal existence. The framework of verbal similarity ironically emphasizes essential dissimilarity, and by this daring device the poet is able to establish the paradoxical quality of the nun's ideal and communicate the ultimate truth it contains: that heavenly bliss is attained not through the gratification of earthly desires (as in the pagan Elysium) but through their total renunciation.

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The Satire of *The Yeomen of the Guard*

It has long been recognized that *The Yeomen of the Guard* does not fit into the general pattern of the Savoy operas. Most critics formulate the difference between the *Yeomen* and the other Gilbert and Sullivan operettas by saying that in it, Gilbert eschewed his customary satirical vein of humour and Gilbertian "topsy-turveydom."¹

² The description of "the island-valley of Avilion" in "Morte D'Arthur," ll. 311-314 (also included in "The Passing of Arthur," ll. 428-431) is in some ways remarkably similar to Hopkins' poem. Tennyson attempted another imitation of these lines in "Lucretius," ll. 104-110 as did Swinburne in *Atalanta in Calydon*, ll. 511-516, but "Heaven-Haven" might have been written before either of these was published.

¹ Cf., for instance, W. A. Darlington, *The World of Gilbert and Sullivan* (London and New York, 1951), p. 126; G. W. Gabriel, Introduction to *H. M. S. Pinafore and Other Plays* (New York, Modern Library, n. d.), p. iv.; A. H. Godwin, *Gilbert and Sullivan: A Critical Appreciation* (London-Toronto-New York, 1926), pp. 25-6, 47, 252; H. Pearson, *Gilbert and Sullivan: A*

Yet discussions of the *Yeomen* in general sentimentalize it and thereby obscure its true significance. To regard the *Yeomen*, as some do, as a "tender little romance which mingles laughter and tears,"² or as "the romantic, somewhat relenting exception" to Gilbert's satire,³ will not suffice to explain its peculiar effect on the spectator. To an audience expecting Gilbert's rollicking cheerfulness, it offers a mood hovering between wry jest and serious drama; and instead of a final solution of all difficulties, it presents an ending in which an apparently "happy" outcome is marred by the discomfiture, not only of Jack Point, but also of Sergeant Meryll and his daughter Phoebe. The sensitive spectator leaves a performance of the *Yeomen*, not cheered, but saddened—not merely because of Jack Point's falling "insensible" (whether in a faint or dead) at the end, but because of the actions of the characters and the mood of the play as a whole.

This peculiar effect of the *Yeomen* has not as yet been satisfactorily explained. It has, of course, been observed that some of the situations in the *Yeomen* parallel those of Fitzball's libretto for Wallace's *Maritana*—not only the last-minute wedding of condemned man and heavily-veiled bride,⁴ but also the use of the deliberately delayed reprieve. Some of the characters and situations derive clearly from Gilbert's earlier operettas, notably the *Mikado*: Goldberg⁵ has called our attention to the presence of the wandering minstrel, the public executioner, and the hasty marriage for a brief time that turns into a lifetime. Dame Carruthers is another of Gilbert's typical predatory middle-aged females, and perhaps the most sadistic of the lot (cf. "When our gallant Norman foes"). Yet it is not in these details, but in the nature of the characters in relation to the plot as a whole, and in the relation of the *Yeomen* to the preceding Savoy operas as a group, that we must seek its significance.

The key to an understanding of Gilbert's "normal" characters—i.e. those who live in Gilbertian "topsy-turveydom"—has been furnished by Clarence Day, Jr., in a penetrating analysis.⁶ He points

Biography (London and New York, 1935), p. 181; H. Saxe-Wyndham, article "Sullivan" in *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 5th ed., vol. VIII, p. 177; etc.

² Godwin, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³ Gabriel, *loc. cit.*

⁴ As pointed out by A. Williamson, *Gilbert and Sullivan* (London, 1953; 2nd edition, 1955), pp. 201-3.

⁵ I. Goldberg, *The Story of Gilbert and Sullivan, or The "Compleat" Savoyard* (New York, 1928), p. 364.

⁶ C. Day, Jr., Introduction to *The Mikado and Other Plays* (New York, Modern Library, n.d.), pp. ix-x.

out that Gilbertian characters derive their special characteristics from the unusual and incongruous emotional fortitude which they manifest in wildly improbable situations:

Now the Anglo-Saxon race . . . really come out strongest when they take up their stand on frontiers. It's when they work at building civilizations in rough, untamed regions, and at teaching law and order to cut-throats, that the world most admires them. Their bourgeois and inartistic desire to make things smooth and even, that has given us so many dull cities and stiff, stupid homes, is a trait of great value when exercised on a frontier.

To go back to Gilbert, the people in his operas are frontiersmen: not geographically, but emotionally. The orderly emotional surroundings that most of us know are exchanged in these operas for scenes of the most frightful turbulence. And mark the result. Just as the Anglo-Saxon pioneer lays primness aside, and becomes a big, vigorous man when he goes to the Rockies, so the frontiersmen of emotion in Gilbert lay aloofness one side, and obtain an astonishing kind of emotional strength.

Apply this conception to the characters of the *Yeomen*, however, and what do we find? A group of people, all of whom are quite ordinary, and all but two of whom are un-heroic, un-generous, and the very opposite of the Gilbertian "frontiersmen of emotion." It is as if Gilbert had decided for once to show how a group of people, similar to his stock characters but without their emotional strength and resilience, would react in a melodramatic situation of the type he was fond of parodying. The result is a sorry mess: the rescue of Fairfax does come off, but boomerangs on its planners; the "happy ending" is only for the rather superficial and callous "hero" Fairfax and "heroine" Elsie; the only two really generous personages, Phoebe and Sergeant Meryll, are rewarded for their generosity by having to promise to marry the repulsive Shadbolt and Dame Carruthers respectively; and the weak, selfish, irresolute Jack Point realises too late where his true happiness lay and loses it miserably.

To see the *Yeomen* in this light—which I believe to be the true one—we must revise the currently prevalent view of a number of the personages of the play, a view which unduly sentimentalises and distorts them, Jack Point most of all. The appeal of this character, particularly in "I have a song to sing, O!" and in his final collapse, has led most critics to idealise him: he has been referred to as "the prince of jesters," the play's "chief source of wit and philosophy,"⁷ "a merryman of infinite wit,"⁸ who is no ordinary strolling player

⁷ Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

⁸ Godwin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

but has a taste for pretty wit and nimble repartee.⁹ Various critics have seen in Point a reflection of Gilbert's own personality,¹⁰ his "essential self" and an "idealised Gilbert,"¹¹ and have considered the *Yeomen* to be Gilbert's "spiritual testament."¹² These estimates of Point are based primarily on the philosophy of professional humour expressed in the songs "I've jest and joke and quip and crank" (Act I) and "Oh! a private buffoon is a light-hearted loon" (Act II). But the philosophy of these two songs is at variance with Point's actual behaviour; basing our analysis purely on the internal evidence of the dialogue, we must come to a quite different estimate of his character. From his first appearance in the play, he is in a sorry state, not merely because he has been "down on his luck,"¹³ but because he is in fact a failure, professionally and personally. He was not skillful enough to judge the Archbishop of Canterbury's mood properly, so that he got himself discharged ignominiously for a jest out of season, and the samples of his jokes which he gives in his conversation with the Lieutenant and elsewhere are stale and "corny." At his best, he relies on a series of already-excogitated "gags" ("my best conundrum wasted!," he exclaims when the Lieutenant fails to take his cue); at his worst, he pilfers his jests from a joke-book. They are, as Granville-Barker observed,¹⁴ very like the feeble humour of the Victorian burlesque à la Planché which Gilbert's wit replaced.

Physically, Point is anything but heroic, as evidenced in his dealing with the angry crowd at his first entrance; in his personal relations he is indecisive and selfish. He is willing enough to run the risk of losing Elsie for the sake of a hundred crowns, as long as he thinks the gain certain, especially since he has not at all made up his mind whether he really wants to marry her or not ("for though I'm a fool, there's a limit to my folly," he tells the Lieutenant). When he has definitely lost her, however, he is suddenly torn by self-pity, which grows throughout the second act until he falls insensible at Elsie's

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

¹⁰ Goldberg, *op. cit.*, p. 364; Godwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-4.

¹¹ Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹² Goldberg, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

¹³ N. O. M. C[ameron], *The Gramophone*, vi (1929), 450.

¹⁴ Cf. H. Granville-Barker, "Exit Planché—Enter Gilbert" (in *The Eighteen-Sixties* [Cambridge, Eng., 1932], pp. 102-48), pp. 147-8: "He [the Lieutenant, after interviewing Point] departs, looking very much as a man may look after reading a round dozen of those mid-Victorian burlesques. After him exit Jack Point, crestfallen. And exit after him . . . [the mid-nineteenth-century authors of burlesques, Planché etc.]."

feet at the end of the play, through a sorrow which he has brought on himself by his earlier indifference to her and his eagerness to make a hundred crowns quickly and effortlessly.

Elsie is a rather empty-headed, selfish lass,¹⁵ who takes her luck where she finds it, and is quite callous towards Jack Point.¹⁶ Fairfax, likewise, is a superficial character, rather unfeeling, and the kind of man who would "test his wife's principles" by making love to her incognito and who would bait her at the end of the play before revealing his identity.¹⁷ It is worthy of notice that neither Elsie nor Fairfax give any thanks to Phoebe and Sergeant Meryll, to whom they owe Fairfax's escape and survival—a lack of gratitude quite in keeping with their personalities.

Both Wilfred Shadbolt and Dame Carruthers are obviously unpleasant characters (Shadbolt none the less so because of his humorous aspects).¹⁸ They fit well into the general pattern of the Gilbertian anti-hero (e. g. Ko-Ko, Deadeye Dick) and anti-heroine (e. g. Katisha, Lady Jane, or Ruth the piratical nursemaid) respectively; and Sullivan gave Dame Carruthers an excellent musical characterisation in "When our gallant Norman foes" and "Rapture, rapture!". They are both essential to the plot, however, as the repulsive persons whose silence Phoebe and her father must purchase by consenting to marry them. From this point of view, the scene between Dame Carruthers and Sergeant Meryll, culminating in the "Rapture, rapture!" duet, does not deserve the condemnation it has received from some critics;¹⁹ nor should this scene be omitted in performance, since it fits perfectly with what has gone before and is necessary to complete the disagreeable outcome of Phoebe's and Sergeant Meryll's efforts (*v. infra*).

The only two likeable characters in the *Yeomen* are, in fact, Phoebe and her father.²⁰ They are the ones who are unselfish and, because of their love for Fairfax, engineer his rescue, which promptly recoils on them in such a way that not only does Phoebe lose him, but she

¹⁵ As pointed out by Godwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-4.

¹⁶ Williamson reports (*op. cit.*, p. 215, fn. 1) that for the 1897 revival, Gilbert changed "who laughed aloud" in Elsie's stanza of "I have a song to sing, O!" in the finale, to "who dropped a tear"; if Gilbert did so, he was falsifying Elsie's character for the sake of a sentimental ending.

¹⁷ Cf. Godwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-9; Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁸ Cf. Godwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-40; Williamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-8.

¹⁹ E. g. Williamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-5; E. Blom, in fn. 1 to p. 177 of H. Saxe-Wyndham's article "Sullivan" in *Grove V*.

²⁰ Cf. Darlington, *op. cit.*, p. 128; Godwin, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Williamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-6.

and her father have to yield to Shadbolt's and Dame Carruthers' unwelcome suits.²¹ If there is any tragedy in the *Yeomen*, it lies, not in Jack Point's misfortunes, but in the undeservedly unhappy outcome for Phoebe and Sergeant Meryll.

In effect, Gilbert is saying to us in the *Yeomen*: "Up to now you have been witnessing, in the previous Savoy operas, the quite impossible and hence amusing antics of the unusual characters of my stock tomfoolery; now see what happens to ordinary human beings when they are put into a similar—nay, a much less impossible—situation. They are callous, selfish, ungrateful, if not actively repulsive; those who are so naïve as to be generous and self-sacrificing not only lose the benefit of their efforts, but have to marry the most unpleasant persons, who in my topsy-turveydom are normally reserved for each other." Satire there is in the *Yeomen*, and in plenty; but it is the bitterest of all satire, that of a man mocking his own work. The *Yeomen* is, in other words, Gilbert's satire on Gilbertian tomfoolery,²² and as such does indeed occupy a special place in the series of the Savoy operas, but in a different sense from the interpretation that has customarily been given to it. It confirms, in a direct artistic manifestation, what we are told concerning Gilbert's attitude towards his "topsy-turveydom": "Gilbert had an extremely high opinion of his contribution to what he believed to be the higher drama, and while Sullivan turned to comic opera with relief, Gilbert turned to it with regret."²³

Gilbert gave the *Yeomen* the somewhat colourless subtitle "The Merryman and his Maid." Possible alternative subtitles might have been "Unpoetic Injustice," or, with reference to *Fidelio* and its kind, "The Rescue that Boomeranged."

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²¹ We can hardly agree with Godwin's opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 140) that "we need offer him [Sgt. Meryll] no commiseration, in that Dame Carruthers should make a splendid mate for this sturdy old yeoman"—an observation which misses one of the major points of the play.

²² It is also, in the history of opera as a whole, a parody of the classical "rescue opera" of the type of Beethoven's *Fidelio* and Cherubini's *Les Deux Journées* (cf. D. Grout, *A Short History of Opera* [New York, 1947], pp. 259, 302 ff., 308 ff.); but this aspect of the *Yeomen* seems less important than its significance within the series of Savoy operas.

²³ Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

Another Webster Allusion in *The Waste Land*

Although T. S. Eliot's allusions in *The Waste Land* to the plays of John Webster are well recognized, both by Mr. Eliot's own notes and through the work of his commentators,¹ there is one such allusion which seemingly has escaped notice. In Part II, "A Game of Chess," these lines occur:

"What is that noise?"

The wind under the door.

"What is that noise now? What is the wind doing?"

Nothing again nothing.

"Do

"You know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do
you remember

"Nothing?"

I remember

Those are pearls that were his eyes.²

Mr. Smith (p. 81) suggests that the monotonous repetition of "Nothing" is "reminiscent (not without gross overtones) of Lear's warning to Cordelia, 'Nothing will come of nothing. Speak again' (*King Lear*, Act I, scene 1, line 92), and of Ophelia's modest answer to Hamlet ('I think nothing, my lord' (*Hamlet*, Act III, scene 2, line 125)." However, there is a close verbal echo here of Flamineo's lines in Webster's *The White Devil*, V. vi. 223-227. After Ludovico, "an Italian Count, but decay'd," asks Flamineo "What dost thinke on?," Flamineo replies,

Nothing; of nothing: leave thy idle questions,

I am ith way to study a long silence,

To prate were idle, I remember nothing.

Thers nothing of so infinit vexation

As mans owne thoughts.³

Not only is the monotonous repetition of *nothing* present here, but it is coupled, as in the Eliot passage, with *remember*. Moreover, this particular passage in *The Waste Land* begins with an allusion to

¹ The most recent and helpful explorer of Mr. Eliot's sources is Grover Smith, Jr., in his *T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays A Study in Sources and Meanings* (Chicago, [1956]).

² Lines 117-126; this citation is from *Collected Poems 1909-1935* (New York, [1946]), pp. 74-75.

³ *Complete Works of John Webster*, ed. F. L. Lucas (London, 1928), I, 189.

Webster's *The Devil's Law Case*: Eliot's note lists this allusion at line 118 ("Is the wind in that door still?"). Eliot, in addition, twice in his notes invites our comparison of his lines with Webster's works; at line 74 of his poem he acknowledges his use of "the Dirge in Webster's *White Devil*," and at line 407 he cites this scene (V. vi) of *The White Devil*. Such a familiarity with and use of Webster's works could certainly have produced another Webster allusion in lines 117-126 of *The Waste Land*.

More important, however, is the appropriateness of the allusion to Webster in this particular passage; the atmosphere that surrounds Flameneo's death is a contrast to the atmosphere of the husband's death-in-life as it is shown in this part of the poem. The play is made up of violent sexual intrigue; this particular section of the poem is just the opposite—the sterility of a futile existence led by a husband and wife. Certainly this contrast of sexual behaviors, both of them extremes, reinforces the contrast of the two women in Part II, the wealthy lady and Lil. In the same manner, the allusion to Webster's work is appropriate here in Eliot's implicit contrast of the lady to Cleopatra, Eve, and Philomel—their sufferings, like that of Vittoria Corombona, held meaning; the sufferings, imagined or real, of the lady are explicitly meaningless.

Interestingly, the husband in this section of the poem does not speak; he only meditates his thoughts. He is like Flameneo in Webster's play, who cries out that he has "lost [his] voice Most irrecoverably" (V. vi. 270-271). Both of them have come to this inarticulate state through their association with women.

Thus we may add another allusion to Webster in *The Waste Land* to the list of them already acknowledged by Mr. Eliot. Characteristically, the verbal echo is subtly used and the texture enriched by the connotations which the allusion brings.

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Initiation and the Moral Sense in Faulkner's *Sanctuary*

Initiation is one of the more familiar basic themes of literature. Traditionally, initiation, as it works out, brings knowledge (both self-knowledge and knowledge about society) for the individual. Furthermore, the pattern constitutes a penetration by the individual into reality through experience; and finally, and ideally, initiation brings maturity and moral awareness. One of the significant themes of *Sanctuary* is shaped by Faulkner's adroit maneuvering of the traditional pattern of initiation into a new set of meanings.

For superficial and perhaps not entirely sound reasons, Wyndham Lewis, who is certainly not one of the more perspicacious critics of Faulkner's work, pointed out quite early that *Sanctuary* is "a highly moral tale."¹ (Perhaps he was not the first to do so, but it was a necessary emphasis at the time.) Indeed *Sanctuary* is concerned with morality, but not primarily with the social morals of the late twenties or early thirties as Lewis finally decides. Rather it is concerned with the amorality of highly particularized individuals in contrast to and, in some cases, in accordance with the pseudo-morality of the social community. My concern, therefore, is with this major theme of initiation as it defines and joins the Temple Drake and Popeye segments of this work.

At seventeen, Temple Drake, the daughter of a judge and a student at "Ole Miss," is living on the fringe of reality and experience. With the town boys no less than with Gowan Stevens, the gentleman from Virginia, "where they teach you to drink," she is engaged in life only superficially. Such experience is of limited value because she can control and shape it as she likes. She exists without thinking and she acts automatically: "She kept the dates written down in her Latin 'pony' so she didn't have to bother about who it was. She'd just dress, and after a while somebody would call for her" (p. 182).² Her date on a particular Saturday, the fatuous Gowan (can this be a pun on *Gawain*?), manages to expose Temple to the lawlessness of a boot-legger's farm, and shortly thereafter abandons her because of his shame at "passing out." The reluctant Temple has now been placed in a

¹ "The Moralist with the Corn-Cob," *Men Without Art* (London, 1934), p. 80.

² Page references are to *Sanctuary* (New York, 1932).

position of sudden accessibility to heightened experience of a sordid and violent nature. For the first time in her life perhaps she is totally outside of the precincts of legality. Passions are uncomplicated by mores and social conventions—if *passions* is an accurate word to use in the cases of Tommy and Popeye. If morality exists here at all, it stands alone without the props of law and social regulation. This is the level of experience on which Temple must face the facts. Her initial fear grows into terror as she realizes that no outside force will save her from the pain of fear. When she rushes between the house and the barn, she is not intentionally trying to seduce the men; but she succeeds in doing so nevertheless. At the outset, when she still depends upon Gowan to get her away, she smiles coquettishly even at Popeye. This, however, is no more than a mechanical reflex action, related to her chaotic, superficial dealings with the town boys who own the cars. Later, when she is incapable of coping at all rationally with her predicament, such behavior is impossible. Aware now that she is in great danger, she knows neither its shape nor its extent. At this time, she has a modicum of awareness perhaps, for she understands her predicament sufficiently to take it seriously and to realize that she is in it alone. Her terror is real, but it is purely self-centered.

The violence done, Temple is taken away by the impotent Popeye. Placed in a brothel at Memphis, she is now further exposed to experience of a type which should cause her to decide what the true facts are in the matter. Having found out that what Popeye has done to her is somewhat less than she has vaguely expected and realizing that Popeye has killed in order to violate her, she now accepts an immediate future with Popeye on his own purely mechanical terms. Paradoxically enough, she takes him as a lover. She calls him "daddy"—a sugar daddy, we presume, who provides her with all that she requires. (Popeye's need to bring in another to satisfy his sexual needs by proxy could, in a very limited sense, be a telling comment on specialization.) Temple destroys Popeye's expensive gifts; she locks him out of her room; and then she taunts him into committing a second murder for her. (It is significant that Popeye kills Red, not to prove that he is a better man, which would, of course, be a matter of pride, but because he sees the killing as both expedient and necessary to his retention of control over Temple.) When Benbow interviews her in Memphis, he perceives her current moral condition quite clearly: "She went on like that, in one of those bright, chatty monologues which women can carry on when they realise that they

have the center of the stage; suddenly Horace realised that she was recounting the experience with actual pride, a sort of naive and impersonal vanity, as though she were making it up, looking from him to Miss Reba with quick, darting glances like a dog driving two cattle along a lane" (pp. 258-9).

Temple has ventured into the terror of the unknown, and she has accepted its violence completely. She has taken the worst that the world offers and she has found it sufficient and somehow acceptable. With her experiences, however, has come neither knowledge nor moral awareness. Her final act while under the influence of Popeye is the damnation of Goodwin through her false testimony. With complete irresponsibility she warps the process of law.

The traditional structure of initiation has come full circle, but initiation has failed. More significant than her mechanical rape is her seduction by amorality. Returned to her father (it is clear that this is no *rescue*), she now yawns sadly in Europe.³ Her experience remains unassimilated incident, for all actions are alike—all decisions carry the same weight. She will not acknowledge the necessity of moral choice, and she will not be responsible for her actions.

Popeye must also be considered in relation to the theme of initiation. His background is handled through historical flashback—something we do not get in the case of Temple. He is characterized as a victim of his heredity primarily and only secondarily as a product of his environment—hence, the special significance of having lived with an insane grandmother, for example. His sexual impotence, as a biological fact, symbolizes, among other things, the impenetrable nature of his consciousness which precludes the possibility of his acting thoughtfully or imaginatively. He reacts only to immediate fact and incident, and his actions are all self-centered and automatic.

Popeye cannot be initiated, for he does not grow in relation to experience. He cannot judge except insofar as his drives or immediate

³ Compare the following: "Temple yawned behind her hand, then she took out a compact and opened it upon a face in miniature sullen and discontented and sad," (p. 379) with T. S. Eliot's use of Marlowe's well-known lines from *The Jew of Malta* as an epigraph to his poem "Portrait of a Lady," *The Complete Poems and Plays* (New York, 1950):

Thou hast committed—
Fornication: but that was in another country,
And besides, the wench is dead.

If nothing more, this is an enlightening comment upon Temple's final moral condition. Certainly such an explanation is apt, for, among other things, *Sanctuary* is a very damning portrait of a lady.

desires are concerned. His life is mechanical, predetermined, fatalistic, and yet efficient within his modest limits. He has little will, and he has no desire or ability to choose and evaluate. He has will only for the small act of the moment. Popeye makes even the crime of murder a small, mechanical act of no personal significance. He dies as he has lived—for no good reason. That he has been tried and is about to be hanged for a murder he did not commit does not seem unjust to him. It is the inevitable working out of his mechanical world. He has lived neither by his wits nor by his moral awareness, for meaningful experience is impossible for him.

If Popeye were the only one who failed to be affected by experience, then we could understand this work upon a simpler, but certainly less meaningful basis. Popeye should be seen as a biological victim or as a victim of the machinery he has lived by. Temple Drake, however, in contrast to Popeye, has not been victimized by heredity. The presumption would certainly be that her father was not syphilitic; that her grandmother was not insane; and that Temple did not spend most of her childhood years in an institution. She has not been biologically disqualified for a consciously moral life. It is Faulkner's emphasis that she is not a victim; rather her failure has been, to a large extent, one of will. The possible source of initiation exists as raw experience; but after it has been encountered, if it is remembered at all, it remains pure memory. Temple cannot sin because she will not see sin as a possibility—indeed as an inevitable condition of life.

If this view is correct, then the title of this work has a further ironic meaning beyond that which sees Temple as a *sanctuary* defiled.⁴ Rather it is of greater significance that Temple remains a *sanctuary* in spite of the defiling. Beyond the religious denotation of this word there is the further purely legalistic denotation: *a place of refuge; and immunity from law by entering such a place*. The *sanctuary*, in this respect, is Temple's moral sense, i. e. the moral sense that she does not have. At the end of this epoch in Temple's life it is clear that she has not been significantly changed.⁵ She has been physically vio-

⁴ See Henry Morton Campbell, "Faulkner's *Sanctuary*," *Explicator*, IV (June 1946), item 61; James Penn Pilkington, "Faulkner's *Sanctuary*," *Explicator*, IV (June 1946), item 61; and Lienhard Bergel, "Faulkner's *Sanctuary*," *Explicator*, VI (December 1947), item 20, for other interpretations of the title.

⁵ Note, for instance, the terms in which Temple is consistently described (italics are mine): "her eyes *blankly* right and left looking, *cool, predatory* and *discreet*" (p. 32); "her eyes, *all pupil* now, rested upon them for a *blank* moment. Then she lifted her hand in a *wan gesture*, whether at them or not, none could have said" (p. 33); "a small, *dead-colored mask*" (p. 123); "her

lated, held in a lawless house, and has committed perjury; yet, in regard to her moral sense, she remains a *virgin*. More significantly, however, she has lost her innocence without having gained moral knowledge. Her refuge from life's meaningful experiences has been complete and effective, for it has been a sanctuary from the law and from herself. Her moral sense has been nonexistent or, at least, completely dormant. Ironically enough then, the sanctuary of her mind has successfully withstood exposure to the means of gaining a moral sense.

It can be discerned then that the pattern of initiation has been uniquely adapted by Faulkner in this work. In effect, Popeye and Temple clearly fail to develop a moral sense through initiation. Popeye's inability to recognize sin and Temple's unwillingness to acknowledge that it exists preclude the possibility of their accepting responsibility for their actions. It is Temple's indifference, her irresponsibility, which is the true tragedy of *Sanctuary*. Popeye, the product of life without moral sense, symbolizes from the start what Temple steadily moves towards and finally becomes in the course of action.

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Ar Cadie

In my "Arcadia in America"¹ I showed that in the last decades of the 16th century Breton and Norman fishermen and fur traders were active in New France and in its waters; that the region that was ultimately called Acadie was referred to in 1575 as *l'Arcadie*,² in 1601 as *Cadie*, in 1603 as *Arcadie*, and thereafter variously, for many years, as *Acadie*, *Lacadie*, *Cadie*, or *La Cadie*; and that the evidence left it uncertain whether the actual sequence of forms was *Arcadie*—*Cadie*—

face looked like a *sleepwalker's*" (p. 162); "Temple looked *vaguely and stupidly*" (p. 162); "with the *blank rigidity of a statue's eyes*" (p. 287); and "gazing like a *drugged person*" (p. 347).

¹ In *Proceedings of The American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 101 (1957), No. 1, 4-30.

² This use of the name was derived from maps on which it appeared as *Larcadia* or *Arcadia*, the form *Larcadia* being due to the cartographer Gastaldi, who got it indirectly from the explorer Verrazzano, who took it from the title of Sannazzaro's *Arcadia*.

Acadie, or *Arcadie*—*Acadie*—*Cadie*; and I offered explanations for the development of either sequence.

Professor L. F. Solano has kindly called my attention to a fact that suggests an explanation that is simpler than any of those that I had offered. That fact is that in Breton *ar* is the regular form of the definite article before *c*, as also before most other consonants.³ To a Breton, therefore, the name *Arcadie* seen on a chart (in the orthography of the time a definite article and its noun were often run together) or heard in speech might suggest a name consisting of the definite article and a substantive *Cadie*; a Breton making a chart might enter the name as *Arcadie* (thinking of it as consisting of two elements) or as *Cadie*; a Breton speaking of the region to a non-Breton Frenchman might speak of it as *Ar Cadie*, as *La Cadie*, or simply as *Cadie*; a non-Breton Frenchman who had enough knowledge of Breton to know that *ar* served in Breton as a definite article might think of *Arcadie*, as seen or heard, as a Breton form for *La Cadie*; and any Frenchman who saw or heard the separate form *Cadie* might accept it (even if he had no knowledge of Breton) as the substantive name of the region concerned.

The custom of prefixing the feminine definite article to regional names is so common in France that any Frenchman who had reason to think of *Cadie* as the substantive name of the region concerned might consider that its full name would be *Lacadie* (thinking of it as consisting of two elements).

To any Frenchman of the time the name *Lacadie* as written or spoken might suggest equally well a form consisting of the full definite article *La* plus a substantive form *Cadie* or a form consisting of the abbreviated definite article *L'* plus a substantive form *Acadie*, the form *Acadie* thus coming into existence as a separate word.

This, I now believe, is the most probable explanation of the process by which *Arcadie* became *Acadie*.

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³ See D. W. F. Hardie, *A Handbook of Modern Breton* (Cardiff, 1948), p. 41.

Plato's *Symposium* and Ficino's Commentary in Lope de Vega's *Dorotea*

It is some indication of the many-sidedness of Lope de Vega's literary culture—comprehensive if not profound—that the text of *La Dorotea* (1632), his most carefully elaborated prose work—called by Lope an *acción en prosa* and cast entirely in dialogue—not only echoes commonplaces of the Platonic-Petrarchan literary tradition,¹ but also reveals familiarity with the two chief sources of Renaissance neo-Platonism, the *Diálogos de amor* of Leo Hebraeus and the commentary of Marsilio Ficino on Plato's *Symposium*. Moreover, it is evident that Lope even went beyond these works to the fountainhead, the *Symposium* itself. The commonplaces, a familiar idiom carried over from Lope's verse, need not detain us and Leo Hebraeus, not for long. Though Lope had certainly read him, he was no favorite: Lope apparently found him too abstruse.² He is cited, rather pedantically, in two passages of *La Dorotea* (pp. 304 and 453). In neither is he dwelt on, though one of the passages does suggest direct transcription.³

Much more distinctive in *La Dorotea* is the use made of Ficino. His commentary on the *Symposium* underlies several lengthy passages in the dialogue and numerous briefer references. We shall seek to reveal the extent and examine the character of the debt to Ficino, a subject hitherto inadequately treated by critics and editors of *La Dorotea*.⁴ It will be seen that while Ficino's commentary is usually

¹ Viz. "El alma está más donde ama que donde anima."; "Todo lo bueno es hermoso."; "... Antes de nacer la quiso Abindarráez en la ideal fantasía de la Naturaleza."; "Del amor me dicen / que es definición / desear lo hermoso." See *La Dorotea*, ed. J. M. Blecua (Madrid, 1955), pp. 167, 308, 261, 234, respectively. (Subsequent references are to this edition.)

² "Es muy oscuro" complains a character in a *comedia*, cited by A. G. de Amezúa, *Lope de Vega en sus cartas* (Madrid, 1935-1943), II, 573.

³ FER. Y adónde ha de haber hermosura fuera de Dorotea?

JUL. En todo aquello que tuviere proporción: que eso es hermosura; porque como dijo en su *Filografía* León Hebreo, la forma que mejor informa la materia hace las partes del cuerpo entre sí mismas más iguales con el todo, unificando el todo con las partes. (p. 304)

The above passage, rather than that cited by Blecua (n. 32), is the actual source of Lope's text.

⁴ On Platonic and neo-Platonic elements in *La Dorotea* and in Lope, see

SOPH. Y de dónde viene que los cuerpos proporcionados nos parecen hermosos?

PHIL. Porque la forma que informa mejor la materia, hace las partes del cuerpo entre sí mismas con el todo proporcionadas y ordenadas intelectualmente . . . unificando el todo y las partes . . . (*Diálogos de amor* [*Filografía*], NBAE, XXI, 425a)

preferred to Plato's original, the two are not always distinct in Lope's mind, Plato often showing through his Italian commentator. Both, however, are used to reinforce the fundamental artistic pattern of the *acción en prosa*, a pattern centering on the interaction between the worlds of art and of actuality.

Not unexpectedly, the *Symposium* and Ficino's commentary are exploited by Lope for much more than the doctrine which distinguishes them—the vision of spiritual love as an ennobling force, in contrast to carnal love, which debases, a vision which in Socrates' speech produces the famous description of a ladder of love leading up to the pure idea of the good and the beautiful. At least as far back as *El peregrino en su patria* (1604) Lope shows familiarity with this doctrine in its original source, not yet crowded out by Ficino, who will Christianize it and broaden it into a conception of love as the motive power of the universe. Lope opens the fifth book of that work with a salutation to love derived from several sections of the *Symposium*, including Pausanias' definition of the two Venuses, base and sublime.⁵ The passage is a direct paraphrase of Plato, with nothing to recall Ficino, but clearly Plato is little more than a passing curiosity with Lope at this stage. He does not pause over him here in *El peregrino* and in the *Rimas humanas*, two years earlier, had shown no interest in Platonic or neo-Platonic doctrines except in the form of a diluted Petrarchism. It is only years later and principally in the sonnets accompanying *La Circe* (1624) that Lope becomes really concerned with concepts of the *Symposium*, both directly and as elaborated in Ficino's commentary. (The two texts appeared together in Latin in Ficino's translation of Plato's works.) At least eight of the sonnets are suggested by or reminiscent of Plato and Ficino; the epigraphs of two of them offer specific evidence of this. One quotes "Plato. de amore" in Ficino's Latin: "Praus est amator ille vulgaris, qui corpus magis quam animum amat." The sentence is part of Pausanias' definition of the two Venuses, which evidently continued to impress Lope, surely because it summed up so vividly the dual tendency of his own amorous nature. The other epigraph reads: "Amor geminus. Ex Marsilio Ficino in conuiu. Plat." ⁶

Amezúa, *op. cit.*, II, 571-576; Alda Croce, *La "Dorotea" di Lope de Vega* (Bari, 1940), pp. 78-82; Menéndez y Pelayo, *Orígenes de la novela in Obras completas*, edic. nac., (Santander, 1947), II, 299-301, n.; Karl Vossler, *Lope de Vega y su tiempo*, 2d. ed. (Madrid, 1940), pp. 294-298.

⁵ See *Obras sueltas*, v, 389-390.

⁶ See *La Circe con otras Rimas y Prosas* (Madrid, 1935), facs. of the 1624

The circumstances of Lope's life, particularly the trials of the relationship with his ailing mistress, Marta de Nevares, help of course to account for the increasing appeal of Plato as he grew older. Ficino, with his Christianized though hardly orthodox commentary on the *Symposium*, now entered the picture for the aging priest and by the time *La Dorotea* appeared had quite overshadowed Plato. Yet, clerical garb or no, it is evident that the aspiration toward a sublime Platonic love only supplements—it does not replace—Lope's earlier more sensual and Ovidian outlook. In *La Dorotea* the choice between Plato's alternatives by no means always favors the higher concept. Indeed, of all the characters, only Don Bela, possessor of the favors but not the love of the heroine, genuinely if tardily pursues Plato's and Ficino's vision.⁷ Elsewhere, the two are simply pillaged, like innumerable other authorities on love, for their most curious thoughts or colorful phrases, good for a moment's shiny display. Or they are paraphrased at greater length in ingenious applications intended as major rhetorical contributions. In short, Platonic or neo-Platonic materials are drawn upon to support both poles of the tension between poetry and history on which *La Dorotea* is built. They contribute both to the higher vision of love and to the unblinking view of its actuality. (Perhaps Lope's preference for Ficino over Leo Hebraeus is due precisely to the scarcity of the picturesque and anecdotal in the latter, the more technical and mystical nature of his thought restricting his usefulness for Lope's purposes.)

The most authentic neo-Platonic echoes in *La Dorotea* are heard in Don Bela's well known madrigal of Act V, "Miré, señora, la ideal belleza . . .," and in his commentary upon it (pp. 504-506), which derive ultimately from the sublimest part of the *Symposium*, the speech of Socrates, and more immediately, from Ficino's commentary. Much of Don Bela's explanation is an elaboration of Ficino's *Oratio secunda, caput quintum*, "Pulchritudo diuina per omnia splendet, et

princeps, fols. 219v and 220r, respectively. The first epigraph occurs in Ficino's Latin translation of the *Symposium* in the bilingual edition (which includes the commentary) *Divini Platonis Opera Omnis quae Exstant. Marsilio Ficino Interprete* (Francofurti, 1602), p. 1181D. (References will be to this edition, which Lope could well have used.) The phrase "Amor geminus" of the second epigraph, which Lope refers to Ficino, actually occurs in Plato at the beginning of the same speech of Pausanias (p. 1179D) but it is evidently fused in Lope's mind with the "geminæ Veneres" and "gemi amoros" of Ficino's commentary.

⁷ Earlier (pp. 243-244) Bela disputes Plato's preference for the lover of the soul—the reference is once again to the twice-noted passage in the speech of Pausanias—and calls Platonic love a "quimera en agravio de la naturaleza."

amatur in omnibus."⁸ Lope's own sentiments toward Marta de Nevares, purified through suffering, come to rest here as Don Bela seeks to extricate himself from carnal passion for Dorotea. The madrigal is largely free of the pedantry that mars Lope's earlier neo-Platonic sonnets; its main originality is its reversal—ascend, then descent—of the usual order of the ladder of love.

The only other occasion on which serious concern with central concepts of Plato is manifested comes two scenes later when Fernando, the hero of the work, now free of love for Dorotea, is reproached by his friend César for his earlier excessive concern with her. César's words recall the Socratic expansion of love in the *Symposium* into the desire for the good in all forms: "Oh, si hubiérades empleado ese cuidado en aquel amor de la divina belleza que en nuestra mente asiste, por cuya gracia seguimos los oficios de la piedad y los estudios de la filosofía y justicia!" (pp. 535-536). Fernando replies: "Qué metido estáis en el amor socrático! Ya de los platónicos me cupo el ínfimo . . . !" and we are back again at the other of Plato's extremes, at an implicit association of Dorotea with the baser love.

The passage which immediately follows, with its frivolous tone and paradoxical substance, well exemplifies the more characteristic manner of appropriation of neo-Platonic materials by the characters of *La Dorotea*. It is a mosaic of fragments taken from three different parts of Ficino's commentary reproduced almost textually. Imbedded in them is a passing reference to a fourth part:⁹

<p>Fer. . . . Si cuanto vive ama, y lo que más parece que repugna es por amor naturalmente, y no por odio, ¿qué os admiráis desta fuerza que el</p>	<p>(From Oratio tertia, cap. III. "Quod sit magister artium et gubernator.")</p> <p>Omnes mundi partes, quia vnus artificis opera sunt, eiusdem machinae membra inter</p>
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⁸ P. 1142D. In both madrigal and commentary, besides the influence of Ficino, there seem to be echoes of Leo Hebraeus' terminology and ideas in phrases like "ejemplares formas," "idea particular," "noticia ejemplar," and in the reference to the limited capacity of human understanding to ascend the ladder. Very likely the earnest concern at this point with what was central, rather than with the peripheral or exotic, in Renaissance neo-Platonism, accounts for the echoes of more complex concepts.

⁹ While the reference to love as a *daemon* occurs in the *Symposium* (see Blecua, p. 536, n. 23), it is likely that this touch, like the rest of the passage (otherwise unnoted by Blecua), stems from Ficino: ". . . Diotima . . . amorem daemonem appellauit: quia . . . daemones inter coelestia et terrena sunt medii. . . ." (p. 1156A). Typical of the loose way with learning characteristic of the figures of *La Dorotea* is the distortion, in order to make a witty point, of the Greek and Latin meaning of *daemon* into that of its Spanish cognate.

mismo filósofo llamó demonio? Amor es nudo perpetuo y cópula del mundo, inmobile sustento de sus partes y firme fundamento de su máquina. El fuego no huye del agua por odio que la tiene, antes por amor propio, rehusando que no le mate con su frialdad, ni ella le apaga porque le aborrece, sino por acrecentarse a sí, solícita convertirle en su materia misma. JUL. Dejad, por Dios, paradojas y impertinencias; que ya sabe don Fernando que el tacto no es parte del amor, ni afecto del amante, sino un deseo de la hermosura y una servil perturbación del hombre.

se in essendo et viuendo similia, mutua quadam charitate sibi inuicem vincuntur, ut meritò dici possit amor nodus perpetuus, et copula mundi, partiumque et eius immobile sustentaculum ac firmum, totius machinae fundamentum. (p. 1145F)

(From Oratio tertia, cap. IV. "Nullum mundi membrum odit aliud membrum.")

Quod si ita est, nulla operis huius membra inimica esse inter se villo pacto possunt. Non enim ignis aqua, aquae odio fugit, sed suiipsius amore: ne ab aquae frigore extinguatur. Neque ignem aqua odio ignis extinguit: sed quodam amplificandi proprii frigoris appetitu trahitur ad aquam sibi similem ex ignis corpore procreandam. (p. 1146A)

(From Oratio secunda, cap. IX. "Quid quaerant amantes.")

Cum vero amor nihil aliud sit, nisi fruenda pulchritudinis desiderium: haec autem solis oculis comprehendatur: solo aspectu amator corporis est contentus. Tangendi vero cupido, non amoris pars est, nec amantis affectus, sed petulantiae species et seruilis hominis perturbatio. (p. 1144E)

Lope must have had Ficino's commentary open before him as he wrote this passage or have come fresh from the reading of it. Yet he is noticeably eclectic in picking the most vivid passages of the original and recombining them. His purpose is to reinforce the character of disputation and display which here, as so often, marks the dialogue of *La Dorotea*. Fernando appropriates concepts of Ficino in self-justification and in order to outshine César. Julio, Fernando's servant, however impatient with the subject, must likewise demonstrate his competence. The rapid quidproquos with which the learned material is interspersed and the impatient tone in which it is uttered are lubricants to keep it from clogging the dialogue. That neo-Platonism is not seriously intended to characterize individual speakers is seen in the ease with which Lope divides neo-Platonic materials among them.

Nevertheless, César is the source of most of the neo-Platonic lore

in the present scene and it is he also who paraphrases at some length (p. 530) a passage in Ficino on curing love, calling it "de lo más curioso que vi en mi vida." Ficino is evidently in this case a mere stand-in for a most non-Platonic poet, Ovid: Lope is attracted by the same type of picturesque *remedia amoris* in both.¹⁰

In a third major adaptation of Ficino, we have an excellent example of how Lope divests a central neo-Platonic concept of its higher significance and uses it to reveal the morbid self-absorption of his hero:

FER. Dime, Julio: en la juventud, ¿no es la sangre más sutil, clara, cálida y dulce?

JUL. El discreto filósofo considera el sentido de la proposición para prevenir lo que ha de responder, conceder o negar. Apostaré que quieres decir que resueltas con la edad aquellas partes sutiles, se hace más crasa y densa, y procediendo los años se muda en sequedad y frialdad. Pues no te llevo diez años; que si te reprendo, no es como viejo, sino como amigo.

FER. Parece que respondes antes que te pregunten.

JUL. Yo no me canso de que ames, sino de que no descanses.

FER. Como el Sol, corazón del mundo, con su circular movimiento forma la luz, y ella se difunde a las cosas inferiores, así mi corazón, con perpetuo movimiento, agitando la sangre, tales espíritus derrama a todo el sujeto, que salen como centellas a los ojos, como suspiros a la boca y amorosos concetos a la lengua.

(From *Oratio septima*, cap. IV. "Amor vulgaris est fascinatio quaedam.")

Sanguis in adolescētia subtilis est, clarus, calidus atque dulcis. Procedenti enim aetate subtilioribus partibus resolutis, fit crassior: propterea fit et obscurior. . . . In sequentibus aetatibus paulatim in contrarias qualitates siccitatem et frigiditatem necessario permutatur. . . .

. . . Atque etiam sicut cor mundi sol suo circuitu lumen, perque lumen virtutes suas ad inferiora demittit: sic corporis nostri cor motu suo quodam perpetuo proximum sibi sanguinem agitans ex eo spiritus in totum corpus, perque illos luminum scintillas, per membra diffundit quidem singula, per oculos autem maximè. (p. 1169A)

¹⁰ The passage occurs in Ficino's *Oratio septima*, Cap. XI, "Curatio amoris" (p. 1171A). It is symptomatic that Lope actually confuses a reference in the *Symposium* to "amatoris periuria" with an Ovidian one to "periuria amantium" as Blecua makes clear (p. 338, n. 42).

JUL. Conozco que tienes en las venas infusa la sangre delicadísima de Dorotea, como, en el Marsilio platónico, Lisias la de Fedro. . . . (pp. 359-360)²¹

It is characteristic of Fernando's egocentricity that he should seize upon this particular passage of Ficino, which likens the vulgar love spread by the heart through the microcosm of the human body to the higher love diffused by the sun's rays through the macrocosm of the universe. Torn from its context, the passage gives the false appearance of sanctifying the baser love. Moreover, through the concept of "perpetuo movimiento," the neo-Platonic theme of love as the motive force of the cosmos will eventually become side-tracked into that of the mobility of love and become lost in Lope's peculiar amatory ideology. Thus Fernando, in elaborating on the idea of his heart's restlessness, will presently observe that "sólo en él se halló con verdad el movimiento perpetuo," (p. 414) and will preface the story of his ultimate *desenamoramiento* with the remark: ". . . Veréis los admirables efectos de las condiciones de nuestra naturaleza, y por qué caminos tan extraños tiene imperio sobre nuestra mayor firmeza la inconstancia" (p. 528).

Stylistically speaking, the present passage once more illustrates how the erudite neo-Platonic material transcribed is so distributed as to create tensions between characters who vie in quoting it and intersperse in it bits of casual chitchat.

That Lope was drawn particularly to the rare and strange in Plato and Ficino is indicated by several of the passages he singles out for brief allusions: Aristophanes' peculiar account in the *Symposium* of Zeus' slicing of the original human creatures in two (p. 533); Ficino's explanation in the commentary to the *Cratylus* of the dual nature of Pan, man and beast (p. 309), the only reference in *La Dorotea* not attributable to the *Symposium* or Ficino's commentary on it. A passage in Ficino's commentary likewise lies behind Fernando's praise of a bereaved lover's devotion: "No le ha faltado a ese amante sino beberse las cenizas de su Amarilis" (p. 302). Cf. "Quod etiam totum in se capere amatum amantes cupiant, Artemisia Mausoli regis Cariae uxor ostendit: quae supra affectionis humanae fidem virum suum amauisse dicitur: eiusque defuncti corpus redegit in pulverem: et

²¹ The source of Julio's final reference will be found in Blecua (p. 360, n. 13), who, however, does not annotate the rest of the passage.

aquae inditum ebibisse" (p 1170B). Inevitably also the Platonic doctrine of the four types of madness makes it appearance (p. 432), significantly with Ficino as intermediary.¹²

A reference, finally, to the inventor of music (p. 526) well shows how Plato and Ficino had become fused in Lope's mind. While he mentions only Ficino, his wording is much closer to Plato in Ficino's Latin:

CES. . . . Lo cierto es que lo fué Amor, porque la armonía es conento, el conento es concordia del son grave y del agudo, y la concordia fué instituida de amor; porque con aquella reciproca benevolencia, se sigue el efeto de la música, que es el deleite. Esta unión amorosa llamó Marsilio Ficino ministra suya. . . . (pp. 526-527)

. . . Ex his quae prius discrepabant, graui scilicet et acuto, deinde per artem musicam consonantibus, harmonia conficitur. . . . Harmonia nanque concentus est. Concentus verò concordia quaedam. . . . Et quemadmodum humoribus medicina concordia, ita vocibus musica consonantiam tribuens, Amorem cōsensumque mutuum gignet. . . . (p. 1183D)

Love as the "ministra" of music appears to correspond to Love as "magister artium," as in the heading of a section of Ficino's commentary from which Lope quotes later in this same scene (see above p. 5) but the rest once more recalls Pausanias' speech, so often referred to, in the *Symposium*. The parallel is evidently not complete: Lope is apparently recalling two texts which have merged into one in his memory.

The foregoing examination of Lope's drawings upon Plato and Ficino in *La Dorotea* provides one more illustration of the suppleness of the medium he evolved for this most personal of his major artistic expressions. Freed of stage restrictions, yet embodying the diverse voices of his own nature in dramatic characters, Lope can blend in this work both the unselfish aspiration of his later years to the noblest form of love and his practical awareness that the lover, in spite of everything, is bound to be self-centered and impatient of too much

¹² CES. . . . aquel furor poético que en su *Platón* divide Marsilio Ficino en cuatro partes. . . . El primero es el poético, el segundo el misterioso, el tercero el vaticinio y el cuarto el amorio: de las musas es la poesía, el misterio de Dionisio, el vaticinio de Apolo y el amor de Venus.

(The wording above corresponds much more exactly than that cited by Blecua [p. 432, n. 24] to Lope's text.)

Quatuor ergo diuini furoris sunt species. Primus quidem poëticus furor. Alter mysterialis. Tertius vaticinium. Amatorius affectus est quartus. Est autem poesis à Musis, mysterium à Dionisio, Vaticinium ab Apolline, Amor à Venere." (p. 1172F)

spirituality. Unlike the subsequent *Rimas humanas y divinas del licenciado Tomé de Burguillos* (1634), where the two strains are merely juxtaposed in their most extreme form—religious and burlesque—, *La Dorotea* fuses them. To this fusion Lope makes Ficino and Plato contribute meaningfully.

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Cervantes and the Jesuits

In one of the most poignant passages of the *Coloquio de los perros* Cervantes, by way of Berganza's commentary, describes and eulogizes in detail the Jesuits and their educational system. The passage in question reads as follows:

No sé qué tiene la virtud, que con alcanzárseme a mí tampoco, o nada, della, luego recibí gusto de ver el amor, el término, la solicitud y la industria con que aquellos benditos padres y maestros enseñaban a aquellos niños, enderezando las tiernas varas de su juventud, porque no torciesen ni tomasen mal siniestro en el camino de la virtud, que juntamente con las letras les mostraban. Consideraba como los reñían con suavidad, los castigaban con misericordia, los animaban con ejemplos, los incitaban con premios y los sobrellevaban con cordura, y, finalmente, como les pintaban la fealtad y horror de los vicios, y les dibujaban la hermosura de las virtudes, para que, aborrecidos ellos y amadas ellas, consiguieron el fin para que fueron criados.

Editors and critics of the *Coloquio*, such as Rodríguez Marín¹ and González Amezúa,² have placed much stress on and have interpreted the passage from the biographical point of view, believing that here Cervantes pays tribute to the Jesuits in remembrance of the period when he resided in Seville and that he may even have attended one of their schools. While this conjecture may have much validity, it should also be pointed out that in the passage, Cervantes either implicitly or with ingenious intentions summarizes the literary and artistic aesthetic of the Jesuits. It is the climax of the passage, " . . . como les pintaban la fealtad de los vicios . . . les dibujaban la her-

¹ Ed. Clásicos castellanos, pp. 242-43; see also his "Cervantes estudió en Sevilla," *Estudios Cervantinos* (Madrid, 1947), pp. 51-64.

² Edición crítica, Madrid, 1912, pp. 497-98; see also Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmus y España* (Mexico, 1950), II, 401; Pamela Waley, "The Unity of the *Casamiento engañoso* and the *Coloquio de los perros*," *BHS*, xxxiv (1957), 210.

mosura de las virtudes . . ." that interests us particularly. It must of course be granted that the phrase "to paint the vices or virtues (i.e. the passions) is a common form of prosopopeia with a long tradition.³ But here, considering that the phrase appears in a Jesuit context, it takes on a much more significant meaning. As it is well known, the Jesuits placed great emphasis on and tried to convey their views through the senses, especially the visual. One frequently cites the following plan from the *Spiritual Exercises* ("meditatio de duobis vexillis") to support this: "Imaginare Deum; Vide ut; Ausculta, ut; Vide ut." It is the Ignatian technique of the application of the senses, to help the imagination to picture to itself in minute detail the horrors of sin and the torments of hell as well as the delights of a pious life.⁴ It can thus also be understood that many of the devotional books, including editions of the *Spiritual Exercises*, emblem books, lives of saints, enhanced by stark illustrations of the vices, were favorite vehicles for the teaching and propaganda of the order.⁵ It seems rather clear that Cervantes sensed this principle and method with the emphasis on the visual, when he brought his analysis of the Jesuit educational system to a significant climax by citing and stressing the topos of the *painting* of the vices and virtues.

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Sartre's Recapturing of Lost Time

It is well enough known that, in the essay presenting his periodical, *Les Temps modernes*, Jean-Paul Sartre delivered a rather violent attack upon Marcel Proust, as a typical bourgeois writer whose analysis of love was false on a number of counts.¹ But, although he did

³ Consult Brewster Rogerson, "The Art of Painting the Passions," *JHI*, xiv (1953), 68-94.

⁴ See Émile Mâle, *L'Art religieux après le Concile de Trente* (Paris, 1932), esp. pp. 206 ff.; Mario Praz, *Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery* (London, 1939), I, 156 ff.; Wilhelm Mrazek, *Ikonologie der barocken Deckenmalerei* (Wien, 1953), pp. 37 ff. Professor F. S. Escibano sheds much light on another passage from Cervantes by comparison to an Ignatian text in "De un tema ignaciano en el Quijote, II, v," *Revista de Literatura*, ix, nos. 19-20, 147-48.

⁵ The most striking example of such Jesuit literature is of course the famous volume published in commemoration of the anniversary of the order, *Imago primi saeculi Societatis Iesu* (Antwerp, 1640).

¹ "Présentation des Temps modernes," in *Les Temps modernes*, 1^{er} octobre 1945, pp. 11-13.

not mention that fact, not all aspects of *A la recherche du temps perdu* could have seemed false to Sartre, for some portions of his own first novel, *La Nausée*, published only seven years earlier than his attack on Proust, present striking analogies to very fundamental elements and themes of Proust's masterpiece.² It is my purpose here to specify these analogies and to attempt to determine their significance.

The most obvious analogy seems to me to be that provided by the parallelism between the effect of the music of Vinteuil in Proust's novel and that of the phonograph record of "Some of these days" in *La Nausée*. It is rather surprising that this suggestive parallelism has, with one exception,³ not been pointed out before. It may be that for most readers of *La Nausée* jazz is not music, and hence no analogy between it and a theme from a violin sonata would ever occur to them.

I am not putting forth any suggestion here that Sartre imitated Proust or that the Vinteuil sonata and septet episodes were the sources of the "Some of these days" episodes in *La Nausée*. I am suggesting, however, that Sartre was quite aware of the analogy, and that, possibly with ironical intent, he was consciously making Roquentin, hero and narrator of *La Nausée*, a counterpart of Swann and (later) of the narrator of Proust. Note the following similarities between the episode of the "petite phrase" of Vinteuil near the beginning of *Un Amour de Swann* and the "Some of these days" episode near the beginning of *La Nausée*: (1) In both cases the listener is fascinated by a piece of music which he endeavors to listen to frequently, but, in both cases, he depends upon someone else to play the music for him: Swann must have it played by the Verdurin's pianist or by Odette; Roquentin must ask Madeleine, the servant at the *Rendez-vous des cheminots*, to play the record on the café phonograph. (2) In both cases the effect upon the listener is striking, and the listener's reaction is not that of pure esthetic appreciation of music as an art; it is an emotional reaction. (3) In both cases the music seems to suggest to the listener the possibility of happiness, a happiness in

² The "Proustian" character of *La Nausée* has been alluded to several times: briefly in Henri Peyre's *Contemporary French Novel* (N. Y., 1955, p. 225), and in Brée and Gupton's *An Age of Fiction* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1957, p. 207), and less briefly and with some specific references in R. G. Cohn's article "Sartre's first novel: *La Nausée*," in *Yale French Studies* 1, pp. 64-65, 1948.

³ Cohn, in the article referred to above, finds a parallelism between the effect of the jazz record at the end of *La Nausée* (he doesn't mention its use at the beginning) and the effect of the septet of Vinteuil, at the end of *Le Temps retrouvé*, but he does not develop this.

some way extratemporal (in the case of Sartre it might be better to say a happiness that is *essence* rather than *existence*), and that does not depend upon the contingencies of life.

Of course there are differences. These are caused (assuming that the similarity between the episodes is not a mere coincidence) to some extent by the fact that, at the point to which I am referring in *Un Amour de Swann*, the narrator analyzes Swann's feelings in lengthy and subtle detail, whereas, in *La Nausée*, Roquentin merely relates feelings which he is incapable of analyzing completely. Sartre came after Proust, and, while surely he was willing to have his work appear as an ironic commentary on his predecessor's, he would not have wanted to appear as an imitator. It was therefore necessary for him to present differently what was fundamentally the same phenomenon.

The following quotations will show some of the similarities and some of the differences. When Swann had heard the theme for the first time:

Elle lui avait proposé aussitôt des voluptés particulières, dont il n'avait jamais eu l'idée avant de l'entendre, dont il ne sentait que rien autre qu'elle ne pourrait les lui faire connaître, et il avait éprouvé pour elle comme un amour inconnu.

D'un rythme lent elle le dirigeait ici d'abord, puis là, puis ailleurs, vers un bonheur noble, inintelligible et précis. Et tout d'un coup, au point où elle était arrivée et d'où il se préparait à la suivre, après une pause d'un instant, brusquement elle changeait de direction, et d'un mouvement nouveau, plus rapide, menu, mélancolique, incessant et doux, elle l'entraînait avec elle vers des perspectives inconnues. Puis elle disparut. (I, 209-210)⁴

The effect upon him was the following:

. . . cet amour pour une phrase musicale sembla un instant devoir amorcer chez Swann la possibilité d'une sorte de rajeunissement . . . (I, 210) . . . il se sentait de nouveau le désir et presque la force de consacrer sa vie . . . (I, 211)

Note that this was before Swann had met Odette, and that when he heard the theme in her company he assimilated it to his love for her. This is a reaction of a sort that did not occur in *La Nausée*, but it should be pointed out that Proust's narrator states that Swann was mistaken in making this assimilation.⁵

In *La Nausée*, when the old record—"le plus vieux disque de la collection, un disque Pathé pour aiguille à saphir" (p. 36)⁶—is played:

⁴All references to Proust are to the Pléiade edition: Paris, 1954, 3 vols.

⁵"... le bonheur proposé par la petite phrase de la sonate à Swann qui s'était trompé en l'assimilant au plaisir de l'amour. . ." (III, 877)

⁶References to *La Nausée* are to the Collection Pourpre edition.

Je commence à me réchauffer, à me sentir heureux. Ça n'est encore rien d'extraordinaire, c'est un petit bonheur de Nausée: il s'étale au fond de la flaque visqueuse, au fond de *notre* temps. . . .

Il y a un autre bonheur: au dehors, il y a cette bande d'acier, l'étroite durée de la musique, qui traverse notre temps de part en part, et le refuse et le déchire de ses sèches petites pointes; il y a un autre temps. . . . (p. 37)

Le dernier accord s'est anéanti. Dans le bref silence qui suit, je sens fortement que ça y est, que *quelque chose est arrivé*.

Silence.

*Some of these days
You'll miss me honey!**
Some of these days

Ce qui vient d'arriver, c'est que la Nausée a disparu. Quand la voix s'est élevée, dans le silence, j'ai senti mon corps se durcir et la Nausée s'est évanouie. (p. 38)

His commentary on this experience a few days later is:

J'ai tant de bonheur quand une négresse chante: quels sommets n'atteindrais-je point si ma propre vie faisait la matière de la mélodie. . . . (p. 60)

In Proust, the theme of the effect of music upon a listener is not a superficial one; the incomplete experience of Swann is, much later, completed by the experience of the narrator, with the "petite phrase" of the sonata of Vinteuil reaching its fruition or rather its apotheosis in the septet of the same composer. And finally the theme (the effect of music on a listener) is woven into the culmination of the novel, the narrator's discovery of his vocation as a writer. But the same is true of *La Nausée*. The general impression of slimy viscosity that many readers have obtained (and not without reason) from Sartre's first novel seems to have for them obscured the fact that this novel too ends with the discovery of a vocation, tentative and maybe ironic, but still a discovery and a discovery in which the record of "Some of these days" plays an even more integral part than Vinteuil's music in Proust.

What has possibly kept the similarity between the end of *A la recherche du temps perdu* and that of *La Nausée* from becoming a commonplace of literary criticism is the fact that in the latter novel there is nothing to correspond to the series of experiences of involuntary memory that are so prominent in the former, in the pages where

* In a well-known Louis Armstrong record of the same piece, made probably at about the same date, the words are definitely: "You're gonna miss me, honey."

occurs the culmination of the narrator's efforts to recapture lost time: the opening pages of volume II of *Le Temps retrouvé*. Admittedly it has been claimed⁸ that Proust's rediscovery of lost memory was satirized by Sartre in *La Nausée*. The passage where Anny, Roquentin's former mistress, explains to him her experiences of "situations privilégiées" and "moments parfaits" (pp. 205-211) might be an allusion to Proust's rediscovery of lost memory, though this is by no means certain,⁹ but there is surely no suggestion of such experiences in connection with the "Some of these days" episodes. Here it is the music alone which has on Roquentin the effect which I shall analyze below.

But first I shall quote the passages in Proust to which I am referring. The nameless narrator, after the delightful series of involuntary memories experienced on entering the Hôtel de Guermantes, meditates fruitfully on them as he waits (an improbably long time, incidentally) in an anteroom while a musical selection is being finished. In the course of this he equates with the extratemporal joy caused by the memory experiences the happiness suggested by the music of Vinteuil:

En repensant à cette joie extratemporelle causée, soit par le bruit de la cuiller, soit par le goût de la madeleine, je me disais: "Était-ce cela ce bonheur proposé par la petite phrase de la sonate à Swann qui s'était trompé en l'assimilant au plaisir de l'amour et n'avait pas su le trouver dans la création artistique; ce bonheur que m'avait fait pressentir comme plus supra-terrestre encore que n'avait fait la petite phrase de la sonate, l'appel rouge et mystérieux de ce septuor que Swann n'avait pu connaître, étant mort comme tant d'autres avant que la vérité faite pour eux eût été révélée. D'ailleurs elle n'eût pu lui servir car cette phrase pouvait bien symboliser un appel mais non créer des forces et faire de Swann l'écrivain qu'il n'était pas." (III, 877-878)

Thus the narrator was encouraged in his literary ambitions, in his attempt to find the reality that lay under the appearances. His experiences at the Hôtel de Guermantes merely confirmed what he had

⁸ In Brée and Guiton's *An Age of Fiction*, p. 207.

⁹ The only place where I find in *La Nausée* a possible satire of Proust's experiences of involuntary memory is the episode in which Roquentin, walking at night through Bouville, feels that *something is waiting for him*, that he is going to have an *adventure*. He connects this feeling with a white boundary-stone ("borne") which he sees in the distance. When he comes up to it, he touches it. Nothing happens! (p. 81) This obviously is not a reproduction of one of Proust's narrator's experiences. But it could be an ironic allusion to them.

felt rather dimly before, when he had heard the Vinteuil septet for the first time:

Mais alors n'est-ce pas que ces éléments, tout le résidu réel que nous sommes obligés de garder pour nous-mêmes, que la causerie ne peut transmettre même de l'ami à l'ami, du maître au disciple, de l'amant à la maîtresse, cet ineffable qui différencie qualitativement ce que chacun a senti et qu'il est obligé de laisser au seuil des phrases où il ne peut communiquer avec autrui qu'en se limitant à des points extérieurs communs à tous et sans intérêt, l'art, l'art d'un Vinteuil . . . le fait apparaître, extériorisant dans les couleurs du spectre la composition intime de ces mondes que nous appelons les individus et que sans l'art nous ne connaîtrions jamais. . . . Le seul véritable voyage, le seul bain de Jouvence, ce ne serait pas d'aller vers de nouveaux paysages, mais d'avoir d'autres yeux, de voir l'univers avec les yeux d'un autre, de cent autres, de voir les cent univers que chacun d'eux voit, que chacun d'eux est; et cela, nous le pouvons avec . . . un Vinteuil; avec leurs pareils, nous volons vraiment d'étoiles en étoiles. . . . (III, 257-258)

For the narrator, the conclusion of his meditation is that, since it is only by works of art that the past can be recaptured, and the hidden, fundamental reality can be transmitted, it is his own function in life to interpret the experiences which communicate this reality to him, and thus create works of art:

En somme, dans ce cas comme dans l'autre, qu'il s'agisse d'impressions comme celles que m'avait données la vue des clochers de Martinville, ou de réminiscences comme celle de l'inégalité des deux marches ou le goût de la madeleine, il fallait tâcher d'interpréter les sensations comme les signes d'autant de lois et d'idées, en essayant de penser, c'est-à-dire, de faire sortir de la pénombre ce que j'avais senti, de le convertir en un équivalent spirituel. Or, ce moyen qui me paraissait le seul, qu'était-ce autre chose que faire une œuvre d'art? (III, 878-879)

The conclusion reached by Roquentin in *La Nausée* is simpler, and is expressed briefly and simply, but it is in many ways similar. Roquentin, deeply demoralized because of his discovery of the nauseating fact of his existence, having given up his only occupation in life—a historical study of a late eighteenth-century figure, the “Marquis de Rollebon”¹⁰—, and about to leave the city of Bouville, where he has been conducting his research, for a life of futility in Paris, listens for the last time to the record of “Some of these days”:

Il faut que je parte. Je me lève, mais je reste un instant hésitant, je voudrais entendre chanter la négresse. Pour la dernière fois.

¹⁰ As far as I know, a purely imaginary person.

Elle chante. En voilà deux qui sont sauvés: le Juif et la Négrresse. Sauvés. Ils se sont peut-être crus perdus jusqu'au bout, noyés dans l'existence. . . . Ils sont un peu pour moi comme des morts, un peu comme des héros de roman; ils se sont lavés du péché d'exister. Pas complètement, bien sûr—mais tout autant qu'un homme peut faire. Cette idée me bouleverse tout d'un coup, parce que je n'espérais même plus ça. Je sens quelque chose qui me frôle timidement et je n'ose pas bouger parce que j'ai peur que ça ne s'en aille. Quelque chose que je ne connaissais plus: une espèce de joie.

La négresse chante. Alors on peut justifier son existence? Un tout petit peu? . . . Est-ce que je ne pourrais pas essayer. . . . Naturellement, il ne s'agirait pas d'un air de musique . . . mais est-ce que je ne pourrais pas, dans un autre genre? . . . Il faudrait que ce soit un livre: je ne sais rien faire d'autre. Mais pas un livre d'histoire. . . . Une autre espèce de livre. Je ne sais pas très bien laquelle—mais il faudrait qu'on devine, derrière les mots imprimés, derrière les pages, quelque chose qui n'existerait pas, qui serait au-dessus de l'existence. . . . Un livre. Naturellement, ça ne serait d'abord qu'un travail ennuyeux et fatigant, ça ne m'empêcherait pas d'exister ni de sentir que j'existe. Mais il viendrait bien un moment où le livre serait écrit, serait derrière moi et je pense qu'un peu de sa clarté tomberait sur mon passé. (pp. 249-250)

Superficially the passages quoted from Sartre may not seem to bear too much resemblance to those I quoted from Proust. But a curious parallelism appears, if one examines closely, especially if one has a general knowledge of Proust's work. Can we not put side by side the "existence," which Roquentin finds so nauseating, with the superficial reality, which Proust's narrator found so disappointing? the effort to recreate the past, which Roquentin had attempted in writing the life of his "Marquis" and which had then disgusted him, with the narrator's unsuccessful attempts to recapture the past by means of conscious, voluntary memory? the New York Jew, whom Roquentin imagines to be the author of the song, and the negress who sings it—who both have thus succeeded in escaping from "existence"—, with Vinteuil, who wrote works of music that succeeded in transmitting to the narrator a comprehension of the deeper reality?

And is not the conclusion the same? Proust's narrator's conclusion that, by the creation of a work of art, fleeting time can be recaptured, and Roquentin's that, by writing a book, a little light (or brightness) would be thrown upon his own past?

What is the significance of these parallels? Is all this pure coincidence? Probably not. I shall certainly not, however, go so far as to say that *A la recherche du temps perdu* is an existentialist novel, and that, for that reason, Sartre used it as a model for his own first

novel. Sartre certainly did not use the whole of Proust's work as a model; he may indeed have been quite unaware that he was making his Roquentin come to the same conclusion about life as Proust's narrator. But I think that this is hardly likely. I think rather that Sartre was familiar with Proust's work, that he found interesting and significant at least two elements in it: the theme of the effect of a work of music, and the conclusions involving the relation of artistic creation to the discovery of hidden reality and the recapture of lost time. May I suggest that Sartre was taking a wry pleasure in making *La Nausée* an ironic counterpart of *A la recherche du temps perdu*; a reduced model, ironic, modern, realistic, a little sordid—in a word, a poor man's Proust.

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“Den ewig Ungenannten” zu Goethes Marienbader Elegie

Will man aus irgendwelchem Grunde die anscheinend labile Vielseitigkeit von Goethes Religiosität stärker hervorheben, so verweist man gewöhnlich auf des Dichters Brief an F. H. Jacobi vom 6. Januar 1813: “Ich für mich kann, bei den mannigfaltigen Richtungen meines Wesens, nicht an einer Denkweise genug haben; als Dichter und Künstler bin ich Polytheist, Pantheist hingegen als Naturforscher, und eins so entschieden als das andre. Bedarf ich eines Gottes für meine Persönlichkeit, als sittlicher Mensch, so ist auch dafür schon gesorgt. Die himmlischen und die irdischen Dinge sind ein so weites Reich, dass die Organe aller Wesen zusammen es nur erfassen mögen.” Viel weniger wird zitiert die prägnantere handschriftliche Fassung des Hauptgedankens aus dem diktierten Brief: “Wir sind naturforschend Pantheisten, dichtend Polytheisten, sittlich Monotheisten.” Was doch wohl heisst: sobald es um den ganzen Menschen geht, bekennt Goethe sich zum Monotheismus. Dass die starke Betonung des Pan- und des Polytheismus auf Kosten von F. H. Jacobi zu setzen ist, ergibt sich klar aus Goethes Besprechung von Jacobis Briefwechsel aus dem Jahre 1827, wo es heisst: “Eine höchst interessante Lektüre fürs Publikum, . . . für mich eine höchst traurige Unterhaltung.” Während der Dichter in der Konsequenz des unendlich Mannigfaltigen

in der Natur am allerdeutlichsten die Handschrift Gottes sieht, bekenne Jacobi, dass die Natur ihm seinen Gott nur verberge: "Nun glaubt er mir triumphierend bewiesen zu haben, dass es keine Naturphilosophie gebe." Gegen Jacobi spielt Goethe dann "unsern Dante" aus, der die Naturphilosophie als Gottes Enkelin preise (J.-A. 38, 124 ff.). Dazu verebbt bei Goethe mit den Jahren der Polytheismus und auch der Pantheismus. In den Sprüchen in Prosa steht der Plural Götter nur noch in Zitaten, sonst heisst es stets Gott. In Eckermanns Gesprächen ist auch der Pantheismus verklungen. Am 18. Oktober 1827 hatte Eckermann Goethe von Rotkehlchen berichtet, die junge Zaunkönige betreuten. Da sagte Goethe: "Wer das hört und nicht an Gott glaubt, dem helfen nicht Moses und nicht die Propheten. Das ist es nun, was ich die Allgegenwart Gottes nenne, der einen Teil seiner unendlichen Liebe überall verbreitet und eingepflanzt hat." Und als Eckermann am 29. Mai 1831 von dem ungewöhnlichen Opfermut eines Grasmückenpaars als kaum glaublich berichtet hatte, sagte Goethe: "Närrischer Mensch, wenn Ihr an Gott glaubtet, so würdet Ihr Euch nicht verwundern. Beseelte Gott den Vogel nicht mit diesem allmächtigen Trieb gegen seine Jungen, and ginge das gleiche nicht durch alles Lebendige der ganzen Natur, die Welt würde nicht bestehen können." Nach dem ersten Satz stehen die Verse:

Ihm ziemt's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
Nie Seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermisst.

Wenn Goethe dann das Gespräch mit den Worten abschliesst: "So aber ist die göttliche Kraft überall verbreitet und die ewige Liebe überall wirksam," so sieht man, dass man die berühmten Verse anders deuten kann als im Sinne eines abstrakten Pantheismus. "Sittlich sind wir Monotheisten."

Wie sehr das die Einstellung Goethes ist, erhellt auch aus dem Westöstlichen Diwan. In den Noten und Abhandlungen lehnt er die indische Vielgötterei als unsinnig ab, weil sie mit ihren vielen tausenden von Göttern die Zufälligkeiten des Lebens nur noch mehr verwirrt, und "selbst eine reinere Vielgötterei, wie die der Griechen und Römer, musste doch zuletzt auf falschem Wege ihre Bekenner und sich selbst verlieren." Freudig begrüsst der Dichter den strengen Monotheismus des Islam, der darin eins ist mit dem Christentum:

Närrisch, dass jeder in seinem Falle

Seine besondere Meinung preist!
Wenn Islam Gott ergeben heisst,
In Islam leben und sterben wir alle . . .

Wir treten hinüber in die Welt des Neuen Testaments:

Gottes ist der Orient!
Gottes ist der Okzident!
Nord- und südliches Gelände
Ruht im Frieden seiner Hände.

Der Antike, wie jeder anderen Vielgötterei bleibt der Friede Gottes wesensfremd, unfassbar. Dieser Begriff aber ist der lebendige Mittelpunkt der Marienbader Elegie, ohne ihn zerfällt das ganze Wundergebilde in nichts.

Und doch erklingt in dieser Elegie eindringlich die dichterische, in der Antike gegründete polytheistische Einstellung. Zuerst in dem leicht veränderten vorangestellten Leitspruch aus Tasso, dann in den an die Geliebte gerichteten Worten, die den Strophen, die uns hier besonders angehen, folgen:

Du hast gut reden, dacht' ich: zum Geleite
Gab dir ein Gott die Gunst des Augenblickes.

Am schwersten aber wiegt die Schlussstrophe, worin sich das bittere Leid, das den Dichter betroffen, zur gewaltigen Anklage zusammenballt:

Mir ist das All, ich bin mir selbst verloren,
Der ich noch erst der Götter Liebling war:
Sie prüften mich, verliehen mir Pandoren,
So reich an Gütern, reicher an Gefahr:
Sie drängten mich zum gabeseligen Munde,
Sie trennen mich, und richten mich zugrunde.

Warum hier Götter? Warum hier nicht dem einen Gotte diese erschütternde Anklage ins Gesicht schleudern? Warum sucht der Dichter hier den Ausweg in der Launenhaftigkeit, die wohl jedem Polytheismus eigen ist? Als Dichter ist Goethe hier noch einmal Polytheist! Aber was sind hier Götter? Darf man von hier aus auf den Sinn des Wortes "den ewig Ungenannten" schliessen und dies als Dativ Pluralis deuten? Das ist die Frage.

Auszugehen ist von der 13ten Strophe:

Dem Frieden Gottes, welcher euch hienieden
Mehr als Vernunft beseliget—wir lesen's—

Vergleich' ich wohl der Liebe heitern Frieden
In Gegenwart des allgeliebten Wesens:
Da ruht das Herz, und nichts vermag zu stören
Den tiefsten Sinn, den Sinn ihr zu gehören.

Wir sind in der Welt des Neuen Testaments, worauf der Dichter ausdrücklich verweist, und sind somit der Welt antiker Vielgötterei entrückt. Dem Frieden Gottes, der uns über alle Vernunft beseligt, vergleicht der Dichter der Liebe heitern Frieden in Gegenwart des einen allgeliebten Wesens. Der eine Gott und die eine Geliebte treten in Parallele. Das religiöse und das Liebeserlebnis durchdringen sich und werden zu eins. Und deshalb kann der Dichter fortfahren:

In unsers Busens Reine wogt ein Streben,
Sich einem Höhern, Reinern, Unbekannten
Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben,
Enträtselnd sich den ewig Ungenannten:
Wir heissen's: fromm sein! — Solcher seligen Höhe
Fühl' ich mich teilhaft, wenn ich vor ihr stehe.

Die Geliebte ist Sinnbild eines Reineren, Höheren, vor dem sich der Dichter in dankbarer Verehrung beugt. Erst bei dem dritten Worte "Unbekannten" wird uns klar: die Rede ist von Gott. Man beachte: dreimal unmittelbar hintereinander eindrucksvoll der Singular, die Bezugnahme auf den einen Gott. Kann der Dichter nun plötzlich unmotiviert zum Plural, zum Polytheismus übergehen? Oder anders gewendet: muss der Leser, den der Dichter mit dem Frieden Gottes eindringlich auf die Welt des Neuen Testaments verwiesen, wird der Leser im nächsten Verse bei den Worten "den ewig Ungenannten" sich polytheistisch umstellen?

Ueber hundert Jahre scheint niemandem die mögliche grammatische Zweideutigkeit des Verses aufgedämmert zu sein. Man wird also wohl den ewig Ungenannten als Akkusativ der Einzahl gelesen haben. Von Düntzer und Viehoff und Loeper geht die Reihe über Harnack und von der Hellen und Alt bis zu Petsch und Baumgart und Ermatinger. Da erscheint im Jahre 1932 Albert Schweitzers Goetherede mit einer neuen Deutung des Verses, die der Redner durch eine Umgestaltung des Textes erreicht:

In unsers Busens Reine wogt ein Streben
Sich einem Reinen, Hohen, Unbekannten
Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben,
Enträtselnd sich dem ewig Ungenannten . . .

Ob diese Umgestaltung auf Versagen des Gedächtnisses oder auf Willkür zurückgeht, berührt uns nicht. Jedenfalls war die mögliche Zweideutigkeit des Verses in seinem ursprünglichen Wortlaut in klares Licht gerückt. Als erster hat hier Emil Staiger Stellung genommen: "Man kann *sich* als Acc. oder Dat. auffassen und demgemäss *den Ungenannten* als Dat. Plur. oder Acc. Sing. Je nachdem lässt sich der Sinn so umschreiben: Das Herz schliesst sich den höhern, ewig ungenannten Mächten auf; es gibt sich ihnen hin . . . oder: Das Herz löst das Rätsel des ewig Ungenannten, d. h. Gottes." Beide Erklärungen, meint Staiger, sind gleich annehmbar: er selber bekennt sich, "allerdings rein gefühlsmässig, zu der ersten." Die Frage bleibt: muss man, kann man hier stehen bleiben? Goethe selber kann unmöglich zwischen zwei Deutungen geschwankt haben. Dass in Goethes späterem Dichten und Denken der Polytheismus und besonders der Pantheismus stark zurücktreten, habe ich schon beleuchtet: "Sittlich sind wir Monotheisten." Zudem ist die ewige Gottheit wohl uns Sterblichen ein Geheimnis, das wir zu enträtseln suchen, aber kaum im gleichen Sinne der sterbliche Mensch der allwissenden Gottheit, was doch bei Staigers Umschreibung der Sinn bliebe, bleiben müsste.¹

Dann, wie steht es mit dem Ausdruck "den ewig Ungenannten" selber? Darf man den anwenden auf der alten Götter bunt Gewimmel, das sich doch ohne Namen gar nicht denken lässt? Inder, Griechen, Römer und Germanen hatten eine Fülle von Namen für ihre Götter. Nicht ohne Bedeutung scheint mir ein Ausspruch Goethes Eckermann gegenüber am 31. Dezember 1823. Es sind nur wenige Monate seit der Niederschrift der Marienbader Elegie verflossen. Eckermann berichtet: "Wir sprachen sodann über religiöse Dinge und den Missbrauch des göttlichen Namens. 'Die Leute traktieren ihn,' sagte Goethe, 'als wäre das unbegreifliche, gar nicht auszudenkende Wesen nicht viel mehr als ihresgleichen. Sie würden sonst nicht sagen: der Herr Gott, der liebe Gott, der gute Gott. Er wird ihnen, besonders den Geistlichen, die ihn täglich im Munde führen, zu einer Phrase, zu einem blossen Namen, wobei sie sich gar nichts denken. Wären sie aber durchdrungen von seiner Grösse, sie würden verstummen und ihn vor Verehrung gar nicht nennen mögen.'" Bewusst oder unbewusst greift der Dichter auf die Welt des Alten Testaments zurück.

¹ Gegen Staigers Deutung, wie ich erst während des Drucks erfahre, wendet sich schon Erich Trunz: Goethe, Gedichte und Epen. 1956, 3. Auflage 1956. S. 586. Er deutet den strittigen Vers ganz wie ich.

Und das Gedicht selber, will mir scheinen, führt zu derselben Deutung.
Was nennt der Dichter fromm sein?

In unsers Busens Reine wogt ein Streben,
Sich einem Reinern, Höhern, Unbekannten
Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben.

So zerschmilzt wie vor der Sonne Walten aller Selbstsinn, Eigennutz und Eigenwille, und so enträtselt sich dem Menschen, aus dem tiefen Gefühl dankbarer Verbundenheit, die unendliche Liebe, das wahre Wesen Gottes, des ewig Ungenannten.

Warum für Goethe Gott der ewig Ungenannte ist, erhellt aus Eckermanns Bericht. Wie tief aber diese Scheu, dieses Zurückbeben vor dem leichtfertigen Gebrauch des göttlichen Namens im Wesen Goethes verankert ist, zeigen die Worte Fausts zu Gretchen, die schon im Urfaust stehen:

Wer darf ihn nennen,
Und wer bekennen:
Ich glaub' ihn?

Am beredtesten kündet diese Frömmigkeit Goethes das "Prooemion" zu Gott und Welt (1816):

Im Namen dessen, der sich selbst erschuf,
Von Ewigkeit in schaffendem Beruf.

Zwei Strophen zum Preise des Ewigschaffenden ohne Nennung eines Namens.

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FRIEDRICH BRUNS

REVIEWS

Rosemond Tuve, *Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. 161 pp. \$4.00). MISS Tuve rightly looks for her friendliest readers among modern Platonists—lovers of the essences embodied in images like the personification of Mirth in *L'Allegro*, who "is one of those three Graces whom the mythographer Conti calls 'deesses de bienfaits'" (p. 17). Her

subjects are symbols of perennial "sureness and dependability" (p. 152) like Circe and Comus; figures like the Good Shepherd, of which Lycidas might have been one of many "earthly types" (p. 103); or "the large image of 'Nature' in the first seven stanzas of *The Hymn*," which is to "broaden and extend into allegory, a vast continued figure," though at first it seems to be so simply "a personification that we find difficulty in taking in (that is, taking seriously) its metaphorical meanings" (pp. 47-48).

In Miss Tuve's title she might have added the word "Genre" to "Images and Themes," for it is on the basis of sometimes novel determinations of genre that her best constructive criticism rests. For her—as for John Arthos, of whom she wrote independently—*Comus* is a masque, and she should agree with him that it is "a masque of faith presenting marvels." She quotes (p. 154) Enid Welsford's distinction between drama and masque on the ground that the latter deals "not with the last phase of a conflict, but with a moment of transformation," expressing "expectancy, crowned by sudden revelation." Revelation becomes the key. *Comus* can be seen as a single metaphor in which the attempted rape of the Lady's chastity is "a way of imaging the problem of man's freedom, within nature of which he is a part" (p. 141), and so "can allow of a revelation of the nature of the opposition between good and evil" (p. 142). Such revelation is part of the genre itself—governing "the kind of relation between abstraction and the concrete in a masque" (p. 113). In this way all objection to the Lady because she lacks dramatic character, or is above temptation, disappears, for any sign of wavering in her "would destroy the *figurative* device of the masque" and impair its revelations of "the relation of virtue to freedom, and man's nature to 'nature,' to reason and to the divine" (p. 142).

The chastity which the Lady in the masque sees "visibly" (l. 216) Miss Tuve sees as potentially a religious virtue to which Heaven would "stoop" if it were feeble. She sees it as inviolable fidelity to God, and as the "natural converse of *luxuria*." Fundamentally she sees it as amounting to "the traditional purport of the Circe allegory—the reasonable soul's freedom from sensual enslavement" (p. 137). From this it follows that she accepts A. S. P. Woodhouse's reading of the "symbols that relate the doctrine of chastity to conceptions of the Christian mind 'grounded in nature and illuminated by grace'" (p. 136), while she challenges all suggestions that the spirit of *Comus* is pagan, or that it opposes Stoic or other pagan thinking to Christian

faith. Indeed in the genre of the masque itself, if its imagery is pastoral, Miss Tuve sees "Christian moral or ontological assumptions" in the "strong web of support provided for human goodness . . . by the very existence of a harmonious natural order" (p. 125).

Genre and the images appropriate to it are made the key to perfect unity in *Lycidas*. Because the pastoral elegy as Milton inherited it was an exfoliation of faith in a harmonious natural order, Miss Tuve sees the poem as a single metaphor reflecting "the sense that there is such a thing as loving pity in the natural universe" (p. 104). This statement is made in contradiction of the suggestion that for Milton the flower passage was a "false surmise" which he rejected in favor of a neutral view of nature. Miss Tuve is not willing to see it as a negative moment in "the ebb and flow of love and hostility in the universe," which is "the secret of *Lycidas*' almost primitive power" (p. 98). But she reads "the Hebrides-St. Michael's Mount passage" as speaking "of the whole crushing human isolation and fragility, of the unreachable dumb body that goes out alone as it came," and yet as pointing to "the loving and pitying superhuman 'guard' in ideas of some meaningful harmony and order" (p. 85). Milton's personal faith in the "order and purpose in nature" as testifying of God might be confirmed from the *Christian Doctrine*, II, i, but in the present argument such evidence is unnecessary. "We accepted the sympathy when we recognized the genre," says Miss Tuve (p. 97), and she rejects Ruskin on the "pathetic fallacy" because "Pastoral's greatest hold upon the imagination," before "the late Romantic separation of man from 'Nature'" (p. 95), was "the sense of unifying harmony between all creatures of 'Nature,' human or not, which is the foundation of the so-called pathetic fallacies" (p. 124).

The disputed "digressions" in *Lycidas* fall easily into Miss Tuve's unifying conception. A brilliant case is made for interpreting the "berries harsh and crude" as having nothing to do with Milton's fancied immaturity. They are seen as part of the ebb and flow of hostility in the universe. Unripe fruit alone suits the situation, and "unripeness is the flaw in our entire condition" (p. 88). This reasoning leads on to Phoebus' reply to the poet's doubts about fame and the rewards of dedicated and disappointed youth. The reply is "Christian" (p. 76), and looks forward to the closing Christian vision of immortality with the pagan image of *Lycidas* as "the genius of the shore," who has

mounted high

Through the dear might of him that walk't the waves.

The "digression" on the clergy is subdued to the poem's unity by treatment as a paradoxical lowering of the style in contrast with "the great symbolic parent image" of the Good Shepherd in St. Peter's speech. "The crowd of lesser images, being all of one kind rhetorically (*meiosis*) set going so strong a current of defamation that the one line where this movement halts ('The hungry Sheep look up, and are not fed') derives thence an accent of most piteous blamelessness and vulnerability, and compassion converts to generosity what might have been arrogance" (p. 80). In this discussion an attempt to solve the riddle of the "two-handed engine" hardly seems necessary, and in commending E. S. LeCompte's study of "That Two-handed Engine and Savonarola" for containing "the fullest discussion of this image" (p. 78) Miss Tuve should not have overlooked W. A. Turner's review of over forty theories about it in *JEGP*, 49 (1950), 562-5.

It would be unfair to leave an impression that this book seeks to be highly original, although, in fact, it is so. It is frankly based upon the established scholarship tracing what once were called the "sources" of *Lycidas* and *Comus*, though it challenges the tracing of the masque to Tasso's *Aminta* or to Peele's *Old Wives' Tale*, because the latter, particularly, "cannot illuminate any character or image in *Comus*" (p. 123, n. 9). The essay on *Il Penseroso* leans upon Panofsky's studies of Albrecht Dürer's "Melancholia I" and upon Lawrence Babb's pursuit of the Saturnian figures of Melancholy and Contemplation through Ficino, Fracastoro, Agrippa, and Melanchthon. No mercy is shown to "historically unsophisticated" explicators of the poems. And in that category Miss Tuve would place all of us who fail to follow her critical conclusions from the fact that each of the companion poems "is 'a praise,' the form of demonstrative oration called *encomium*" (p. 35).

Reasonable doubt over Miss Tuve's classifications of Milton's poems arises when she questions whether the poem *On the Morning of Christ's Nativity* "would have been thought of as a pastoral by any seventeenth-century reader" (p. 42), and without even referring to E. K. Rand by name, brushes aside his view that "it is not a hymn, though it contains what is entitled a hymn" (*SP*, xix, 127), and is, in fact, modelled upon "Virgil's Messianic eclogue." When due allowance has been made for the great Latinist's prejudice in favor of Roman models for Milton, some weight must be granted to his verbal parallels and broader resemblances in Milton's poem to the "Birth Song, sung

by the Fates upon the advent of a young son and heir in the household of Pollio, in 40 B. C., when Pollio was consul and a happy augury of peace had presented itself to the faction-ridden Roman state." In Virgil's treatment of the impending advent of Pollio's child as an "event symbolic of the return of the Golden Age," Rand believed that "Milton found a challenge to write a true Messianic eclogue, in which all Pagan dross has been purged away." The Virgilian theme is peace—as Miss Tuve observes that it is throughout Milton's poem:

pacatamque reget patriis virtutibus orbem.

But Miss Tuve declares that Milton's poem is strictly designed as a hymn, "a liturgical act of praise" (p. 42). Though she acknowledges that his control of the "relationship between theme [peace] and imagery does not have that near perfection he was later to demand of himself" (p. 37), she glides over the problem of ranking it in Milton's hierarchy of symbols above music and light, which seem to her to be the two most "conceptually necessary symbols in the poem" (p. 57). It is light which becomes the finally dominating symbol in her hierarchy, and in her search for unity she makes it override what she regards as the pure metaphor "of the abdicating gods" (p. 64). That metaphor is, she explains, "'continued,' as allegory is, and depends all from the prior statement in [stanza] xviii, where the Dragon is truly symbolic." For her both the Dragon and the abdicating gods are lesser symbols in the greater symbolism of Light and Darkness.

That the Dragon and the pagan deities may also be more than symbols, that to Milton they were also beings of mysterious creation before the world began, is a fact ignored in Miss Tuve's analysis of the poem because it does not easily square with her view that—as a hymn, as a liturgical act of praise, it deals strictly with the Incarnation, not with the Advent. But for Milton the Advent was an historical fact, one of whose chief historical consequences was the cessation of the oracles and the desertion of the altars of the pagan gods. The cessation was a fact even though, as a Cambridge don, Joseph Mede, had declared in Milton's student days, it also allegorically signified the defeat of the gods of darkness. Milton wrote in the tradition of Lactantius and the many Christian writers who—as Miss Hartwell has shown¹—accepted the cessation of the oracles as

¹ Kathleen Hartwell, *Lactantius and Milton*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1929. P. 63.

an historical event as certain as the Advent of Christ itself. How far Milton rationalized it is hard to tell, but his thinking was certainly a long way short of Fontenelle's when he began the *Histoire des Oracles*, in 1686, by saying: "Mon dessein n'est pas de traiter directement l'Histoire des Oracles: je ne me propose que de combattre l'opinion commune qui les attribue aux Démons, et les fait cesser à la venue de Jesus-Christ." It hardly seems justifiable to equate Milton's attitude toward the abdicating gods with Fontenelle's, simply in order to sustain the thesis that Milton's poem deals strictly with the Incarnation, and not with the Advent. But whether or not this objection to Miss Tuve's interpretation of the abdicating gods as pure metaphor is valid, it must not obscure the fact that as a whole her book is a rare expression of direct pleasure in the reading of poetry in combination with thorough scholarship and critical originality.

University of Wisconsin

MERRITT Y. HUGHES

K.-J. Hollyman, *Le Développement du vocabulaire féodal en France pendant le haut moyen âge* (Geneva: Droz, and Paris: Minard, 1957. 202 pp. Société de Publications Romanes et Françaises, LVIII). THE development of mediaeval legal terminology has long occupied both historians and linguists. The subject is extremely complex and difficult. While most of the terms have their origin in classical Latin, they underwent continuous change both in form and meaning during the Late Empire and the Middle Ages. Moreover the extreme regionalism of the Middle Ages resulted in a wide disparity in terminology from region to region.

Mr. Hollyman has traced the history of a score of terms which he chooses to call "feudal" from their origin in Latin, Celtic, or German to about the year 1100. He has read very extensively in both secondary works and original texts. While the history of some of these terms such as *terre*, *baron*, and *comte* is easily shown, others like *fief*, *service*, *sergent*, and *vassal* are very difficult. Mr. Hollyman discusses the theories of other scholars, advances his own, and illustrates his points with quotations. His theories show both imagination and good judgment. The discussions of *fief* and *service* approach the brilliant. In short, this is a stimulating, valuable book which every student of mediaeval institutions should read.

Unfortunately from the point of view of an historian Mr. Hollyman's work is disappointing. He has attempted to cover far too much ground. He insists on using "feudal" in its broad sense to mean all the institutions of mediaeval rural society. The reason he gives for this choice is in reality the strongest argument against it. Mr. Hollyman states that the fief has no reality without the relations between lord and peasants. Actually feudalism could be and was supported by any source of income available including well-organized manors, Celtic tribesmen, scattered free peasants, and the tolls collected at markets.

By undertaking to describe the development of so many terms, Mr. Hollyman was obliged to treat some of them too briefly. His section on "Le Serf" is completely inadequate. His treatment of this subject is satisfactory only in the comparatively few cases where Roman villas became Carolingian villas and later mediaeval manors. The whole question is far more involved than Mr. Hollyman realizes. Thus M. Duby has shown the very complex relationship between the *servi* of tenth-century charters (in some regions at least) and the later serfs. Then in dealing with the title *duc* Mr. Hollyman ignores the question which most interests the historian—how and when did it acquire its mediaeval meaning of the leader of a racial group with certain semi-royal prerogatives? Mr. Hollyman dismisses the term *dominium* in a sentence about the derivatives from *dominus*, but it is one of the most complicated and important terms connected with feudalism.

Had Mr. Hollyman confined his definition of feudalism to the meaning used by English and American scholars and such continental scholars as Ganshof, he would have produced a far more thorough and hence more valuable work. This reviewer hopes that Mr. Hollyman may some day fill in the gaps with the same skill he has shown in this book.

The Johns Hopkins University

SIDNEY PAINTER

Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, tr. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. xxvi + 1194 pp. \$12.50). MR. Frame, in an introductory note to his new translation of the complete works of Montaigne, explains the spirit and method

of his undertaking as follows: "I have tried . . . to express Montaigne as I think he would have expressed himself had he been writing in English today." There has long been the need of an English translation of Montaigne so conceived, and I think that modern scholars will agree that Mr. Frame has admirably succeeded in his task. The first English translation, that of Florio, while presenting a certain historic interest since it is the form in which Shakespeare read Montaigne, is so archaic in style as to create irritatingly picturesque obstacles between the reader and not only the thought of the author, but also the true flavor of his style; and Florio of course contains many inaccuracies. But likewise more recent attempts, such as those of Hazlitt, Trechmann, or Zeitlin, leave much to be desired; even when they give the English-speaking reader an adequate representation of Montaigne's ideas, they fail, in the main, to provide an accurate modern equivalent of his style. Since Montaigne belongs to the history of literature rather than to the history of philosophy, this is an important failing. I think it is no exaggeration to say that, until the appearance of Mr. Frame's work, the non-French-speaking American or Englishman was unable to appreciate Montaigne. The *Essays*, which are inseparable from their form, are also "consubstantial" with their author; and so, in order to know Montaigne, we must experience his style. I should be tempted to say that we now have the definitive English translation, were it not for the fact that, in the distant future, the same evolution of language which has made Florio unsatisfactory for us, may cause later generations to find in Mr. Frame's work a quaintly twentieth-century flavor. When this time comes—and not before—another English-speaking scholar may attempt to render Montaigne in the English of his own period.

One of the greatest merits of the present edition is that it is not limited to the *Essays*: it contains as well the *Travel Journal* and the *Letters*. By translating every word that Montaigne ever wrote, Mr. Frame has given the English-speaking reader the means for a complete understanding of the man as well as the writer. Among the letters, that to Montaigne's father, on the death of La Boétie in 1563, is specially interesting and revealing. A good many of the letters had been translated once before, by Hazlitt, but this is the first translation of all thirty-nine.

The inclusion of an agreeable and faithful translation of the *Travel Journal* is also most useful to the student of Montaigne. This work, which was lost for nearly two centuries, was accidentally discovered

and published for the first time in 1774; the fact that its author never intended it for publication is a guarantee of its sincerity and accuracy for the portrayal of Montaigne. Although the *Essays* were unquestionably written in good faith, their author could not fail to be aware of a growing and appreciative audience, and so—however unconsciously—to make slight modifications in his self-portraiture. His personal faults, though never concealed, tend to be presented in an amiable light. The *Travel Journal*, being strictly private, reveals in an even more intimate way than the *Essays* many details of the writer's life. Two elements predominate: Montaigne's illness, its day-by-day symptoms and care, and practical details concerning hotels, meals and prices. In connection with the latter, Mr. Frame is to be congratulated on providing a table of money equivalents in 1957 dollars, based on the assumption that a *livre*, in terms of modern American purchasing power, represents about \$3. This table adds greatly to the interest of the *Journal*, where financial details play as important a part as they do in the novels of Balzac, and are equally in need of interpretation for the present-day reader. It must be admitted that, from a strictly literary point of view, the *Journal* has slight value, and that Mr. Frame, while remaining completely scrupulous as a translator, has somehow made his version much more readable than the original.

With regard to the translation of the *Essays*, Mr. Frame is to be commended for reproducing the A-B-C system of notation adopted by Villey and other French editors to indicate the dates—1580, 1588, 1595—of successive strata of the text. Because of Montaigne's habit of constantly adding but almost never deleting, many passages would, without these indications, be bewilderingly contradictory. To the present reviewer, perhaps the greatest fascination of the *Essays* lies in the opportunity they provide for studying the evolution of a mind over a period of twenty years. The A-B-C system, so wisely retained here, is of great assistance in both these respects.

It also seems to me an excellent plan, as Mr. Frame has done, to divide the *Apology for Raymond Sebond* into sections with clarifying headings. This essay is probably the most difficult of all for the uninitiated or inattentive reader to follow, and such a system of division greatly simplifies the student's task. The titles of the sections, while derived from Villey, are in certain important ways Mr. Frame's own. Although they tend to lead the reader to a more fideist and religious interpretation of the essay than was prevalent

until about twenty years ago, this conception is in accordance with the conclusions of modern critics and is (it appears to me) confirmed by details of Montaigne's religious practice as reported in the *Journal* and in Pasquier's account of his death.

In a work of so vast a scope as Mr. Frame's, it is difficult to give the prospective reader an idea of the accuracy and literary quality of the translation. However, a few brief samples may be cited, which render famous passages well known to those who have long enjoyed Montaigne in French:

. . . I would also urge that care be taken to choose a guide with a well-made rather than a well-filled head; that both these qualities should be required of him, but more particularly character and understanding than learning; and that he should go about his job in a novel way.

Our tutors never stop bawling into our ears, as though they were pouring water into a funnel; and our task is only to repeat what has been told us. I should like the tutor to correct this practice, and right from the start, according to the capacity of the mind he has in hand, to begin putting it through its paces, making it taste things, choose them, and discern them by itself; sometimes clearing the way for him, sometimes letting him clear his own way. I don't want him to think and talk alone, I want him to listen to his pupil speaking in his turn. ("Of the Education of Children," Book I, ch. 26.)

I set forth a humble and inglorious life; that does not matter. You can tie up all moral philosophy with a common and private life just as well as with a life of richer stuff. Each man bears the entire form of man's estate. ("Of Repentance," Book III, ch. 2.)

It is an absolute perfection and virtually divine to know how to enjoy our being rightfully. We seek other conditions because we do not understand the use of our own, and go outside of ourselves because we do not know what it is like inside. Yet there is no use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still walk on our own legs. And on the loftiest throne in the world we are still sitting only on our own rump. ("Of Experience," Book III, ch. 13.)

I think that all *Montaignisants* will recognize in these passages the true ring of their favorite author. In addition, the final sentence of the third quotation serves to illustrate a noteworthy merit of the translator: he never shrinks from the forthrightness of Montaigne's style. This is a translation unmarred by prudishness; if the reader wishes to convince himself that the vigor of the language has been preserved, he has only to peruse Mr. Frame's rendering of the chapter *On some verses of Virgil*.

Mr. Frame has translated the Latin quotations which stud the

pages of the *Essays*; in this, he follows the practice of Strowski, Villey, and other French editors. As a matter of convenience to most readers, this is indispensable, and Mr. Frame was quite right to do so. However, while these translations are correct, I question whether it was wise to introduce English rhymes in rendering the Latin poets. Montaigne tells us that, all his life, he was specially moved by Virgil, Horace, and Lucretius, and it seems to me that here a certain jingling effect is sometimes achieved which does not reflect the spirit of the classical originals, so beloved by the essayist.

But this is, in so great and excellent a work, a very minor stricture. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Mr. Frame, by making Montaigne in all his richness, flavor, and truth fully accessible for the first time to a modern English-speaking audience, has done great service, not only to the general reader, but also to Renaissance and Baroque scholarship.

Yale University

IMBRIE BUFFUM

Judd D. Hubert, *Essai d'exégèse racinienne: Les secrets témoins* (Paris: Librairie Nizet, 1956. 278 pp.). IN the manner of the Anglo-American "New Critics" whom he has already emulated in a sensitive study of Baudelaire, Professor Hubert studies Racine's plays chronologically as a series of poems. He recognizes, of course, that these poems are also plays and the categories under which he promises to analyze them even lead one to hope for further re-examination of Racinian dramaturgy. Yet it is primarily "la cohérence intérieure," understood as a matter of tone or a function of language, that he seeks out in his studies of the individual plays. "Le narcissisme" (the psychological theme of identity) and "la perfection, source de tragédie" (the moral issues of the plays) are regarded chiefly as aesthetic referents of this pervasive, tonal unity. True, the study of the famous unities is somewhat less subordinate in the chapters on *La Thébaine* and *Athalie*. However, except for *Bajazet* as well, where the semantic field centering around the notion of imprisonment moves the unity of place into the forefront of awareness, Professor Hubert concentrates on the vocabulary of the plays as the chief vehicle of their affective and moral meanings. Thus, in *Andromaque*, military terms applied to love as well as war show us an Andromaque besieged but triumphant

as her stratagems, forged out of loyalty-fidelity to her dead husband, lead to "la revanche troyenne"; in *Britannicus*, the symbolism of vision expresses the theme of identity or self-definition in the "monstre naissant," Néron, as well as in the "monstre mourant," Agrippine; in *Phèdre*, the symbolism of monstrosity expresses the irredeemable corruption of the human condition.

In the hands of a less subtle reader, such a close reading of the plays would yield little more than a lexicon. But Professor Hubert skillfully relates these various verbal complexes to the overriding themes of identity and the thirst for innocence or perfection which marks so many Racinian characters. Yet not even he can escape that critical myopia which seems to affect the textual critic when he approaches dramatic structures. Derived from a close reading of the relatively short lyric poem, this technique seems inadequate, or perhaps not designed, for dealing with the larger features of structure. The demands are great, but surely what is needed is a double attention: to the action as well as the language.

Such an approach to Racine leads to interesting perspectives. In no other major dramatist is there on occasion such a contradiction between *texture* (aesthetic effects produced by language) and *structure* (aesthetic effects produced by action). The outcome of events often reverses the tone. Thus, noting that more often than not the outcome provides a true solution "selon les lois constitutives de l'univers de la pièce," M. Goldmann has reduced the number of true tragedies in Racine to three: *Britannicus*, *Bérénice*, and *Phèdre* (*Jean Racine, dramaturge*. Paris: L'Arche, 1956, p. 13). Indeed, depending on whom we regard as the central figure of the play, perhaps even *Britannicus* and *Bérénice* are not true tragedies in Goldmann's sense, but are what he calls *dramas* (subjects for doctoral dissertations: *Tragi-comedy in Racine and Racine's Melodramas*). Professor Hubert comes close to such a thesis on *Bérénice* when he suggests that, in a certain sense, Antiochus can be regarded as the most tragic figure of the play. For him the question is one of degree, but elsewhere in the chapter he provides the key to a nontragic view of the two central characters: "Et l'on peut dire que si Bérénice a entraîné Titus dans la voie de l'honneur et de la perfection, c'est Titus finalement qui mène sa maîtresse jusqu'au sommet de la gloire et du renoncement" (p. 130). Love yields to glory. The antithesis is Cornelian and there is something of a Cornelian (hence untragic) resolution in that the lovers love each other more deeply and possess each other more surely

after the renunciation than before. Like death for the Cornelian hero, renunciation here becomes an instrument of self-assertion or, in Professor Hubert's terms, of self-perfection. If achieved, perfection cannot be "la source de tragédie." As in *Andromaque* and *Alexandre*, the central characters emerge not only unscathed but triumphant. If this seems apparent in *Alexandre* (where only a single tragic moment is recognized, and this belonging to the secondary Taxile), should it be less so in *Andromaque*, especially if we agree to regard Andromaque herself and her physically dead but dramatically vital husband as the central characters of the play?

Attention to the outcome of Racine's "tragedies" re-enforces a suspicion that he is far more Cornelian than we have been willing to allow. Not only is the tragedy often relegated to the secondary characters, but there is on occasion outright refusal of the tragic: witness *Mithridate* and *Iphigénie*. The dramaturgy of the latter anticipates that of *Phèdre*: the tragic figure takes a number of rational measures to frustrate fate: exclusion, flight, seclusion, etc. They all fail and bring him progressively closer to the tragic illumination that man's resources are limited and insufficient in an unknowable, if not hostile universe. But with the revelation of Eriphile as the Iphigénie destined for sacrifice, Agamemnon is spared that act which will complete his growing awareness of such limitation. M. Hubert is not unaware of such an interpretation, but in an apparently desperate attempt to preserve the play as a tragedy, he calls it "la première tragédie de l'engagement" (p. 199). This fringes on the absurd, for there is nothing less existentialist than Racinian tragedy. If the tragic dilemma, as the existentialists see it, is that man is constantly confronted with painful, unavoidable choices, that no choice is definitive and that, in a never ending dialectic, each new choice only poses further choices, then we could not be further from Racine. Racinian tragedy may be described as the uncompromising exposé of the illusion that "where there is life, there is hope." The cultivation of this illusion by various characters provides the *dynamism* of Racinian dramaturgy (we have had enough talk about Racinian *stasis*); the destruction of the illusion—dis-illusionment or *des-espérance*—brings this dynamism to its rest. Existentialists also fulminate against "le sale espoir" (notably Sartre), but they do so against hope as a psychological datum understood as a sop whereas their very dialectic forces them to regard it as a metaphysical datum synonymous with possibility. Action, according to a tragedy of *engagement*, is reality, the means to self-

definition; action, according to Racinian tragedy, is illusory, the path to self-negation. *Phèdre* is the great (perhaps the unique) demonstration of this view.

But, as I have suggested, Professor Hubert does not concern himself with the dynamics of Racinian dramaturgy. Not that he is basically uninterested in the moral meanings of the action. It is simply that these have been preresolved for him in the view of Racine as a Jansenist "avant la lettre." Apart from his discussion of *Esther* and *Athalie* with their explicitly religious subjects, he never systematically argues the case for the Jansenism of the plays. It is fair to say that with repeated formulations like "pour un janséniste aussi intransigent que Racine . . ." (p. 139) and "en janséniste raffiné du XVII^e siècle . . ." (p. 142), he assumes rather than discusses the point.

Yet it is properly a matter of discussion. One wonders if Jansenism—to the degree that it remains Christian—and tragedy are really as compatible as Professor Hubert assumes. In a profound work, Reinhold Niebuhr describes Christianity as "beyond tragedy," beyond the vision of man as a limited figure without suprahuman recourse in an incomprehensible and terrifying universe. Surely as he approximates this position with categories of "péché," "expiation," and transcendent "perfection morale" applied to the profane as well as the religious plays, Professor Hubert is himself describing a Racine "beyond tragedy." To see Pyrrhus or Atalide atoning for their sins in their final *punishments* is to reduce Racinian drama to a catechetical vision. In tragedy, the good and the bad lose out. As they do, to be sure, in extreme Jansenism. But then all the greater is the problem for Professor Hubert in reconciling the thesis of expiation and reward with an extremist theology regarding man as both deprived and depraved, and as totally incapable of any action, in this world, which would be at once sign and instrument of his salvation or damnation.

But the plays need not be regarded from such a catechetical point of view. If we must import influences, why not those of the pre-Christian dramatists Racine knew so well? What of Racine's own experience? Not that I mean for Professor Hubert to renounce his textual orientation for one which tracks down every fact of a writer's biography in order to insert it into his work. But can we not try the plays out as the sum of one man's experience in the world? Such an approach would have been consistent with Professor Hubert's "New Critical" slant and, allowing the plays to stand free as it were,

perhaps would have enabled him to find that "connaissance" or tragic illumination which he mistakenly sees as missing in Racinian tragedy (thus distinguishing it, he believes, from Greek tragedy). As *Phèdre* teaches us, illumination is possible. Nor am I speaking of the final insights of the tragic queen, for her illumination—real as it is—is spoken in the accents of pain and defeat. But surely there is the triumphant illumination of the play *Phèdre*, as it provides us with the specifically human *grace*—if Professor Hubert permits—of overcoming our limitations not by surrendering our humanity to "le Dieu caché" whom he apparently regards as the dominant, if absent character of all the plays, but by creating or enjoying that work in which our humanity finds its noblest and its most complete expression, the great work of art.

In the final chapter Professor Hubert sketchily traces the decline of classical French tragedy after Racine, studying briefly Crébillon's *Atrée et Thyeste* and Voltaire's *Zaïre*. Perhaps a concluding chapter summarizing the insights of the individual studies would have been more in order, providing the occasion to reach those independent conclusions one feels lacking in the book. However, this book represents an important addition to Racinian criticism precisely for those many pages in which the author has allowed his scrupulous close-reading techniques to operate on "la cohérence intérieure" of the most coherent drama the modern world has known.

University of Michigan

ROBERT J. NELSON

Katherine E. Wheatley, *Racine and English Classicism* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1956. xi + 345 pp. \$6.00). IT is a curious circumstance of English literary history that, at a time when neoclassicism was at high tide, playwrights and critics were largely insensitive to Racine's plays, which now seem the most impressive expression of neoclassicism in tragedy produced in Europe. John Dennis alone of the major Augustan critics gave evidence of a full knowledge and appreciation of the plays; and no one of the dramatists produced an adequate translation or adaptation. This book is an enquiry into the causes of the English blindness to Racine. In the first of its two parts—"Racine Improved"—Miss Wheatley demonstrates the inadequacy of the translations and adaptations; in the second part—

"Racine and English Classicism"—she seeks, mainly in a comparative study of French and English critical theory, an explanation for the inadequacy.

Her explanation of the English failure with respect to Racine is an extended one, the core of which, however, is here suggested (p. 254):

In their search for that regularity which would bring to fruition their native genius for tragedy, the English read French theory in preference to French dramatists, whom they looked upon as handicapped in the first place by a want of natural genius and in the second place by a language better suited to courting and to billets-doux than to sublime poetry.

Among the earlier French theorists, Miss Wheatley explains, Racine had no apologists. Since most of the English theorists lacked close knowledge of his plays, they had no opportunity to revise in the light of his accomplishment their opinions on the diction appropriate to tragedy and on poetic justice—opinions which were strongly influenced by French theorists with whom Racine disagreed. It is an ironical fact that the very influence in England of French seventeenth-century critical theory inhibited the appreciation of Racine. The French critics, notably Rapin and La Mesnardière, who exercised the strongest influence in England were associated with critical positions incompatible with Racinian tragedy. Rapin urged an ornamented and heightened diction for tragedy not at all like the unadorned diction of Racine; La Mesnardière urged a poetic justice in tragedy unlike the non-distributive justice of Racine. The French recommendation of heightened diction reinforced the native English tendency to bombast, even in adaptations of Racine; and the recommendation of poetic justice reinforced the English neoclassical striving for a patent orderliness, again even in adaptations of Racine. Influenced by critical theory, the English were more receptive to Corneille than to Racine.

It is possible, I think, that Miss Wheatley overstates the importance of critical theory in determining the fate of Racine in England. If her explanation for the English imperceptiveness is on the whole convincing, she nevertheless makes insufficient acknowledgment of the mere incapacity of most of the English dramatists who made the adaptations. Certainly no complicated explanation is needed of why such dramatists as John Crowne, Abel Boyer, Edmund Smith, Charles Johnson, and Mrs. J. Robe failed. Miss Wheatley would seem to imply in her preface (p. ix) that she thinks erroneous the traditional view that Racine is untranslatable:

I am not sure that the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century versions of Racine in English have ceased, even now, to influence English opinion. Racine's latest English biographer, Geoffrey Brereton, in his *Jean Racine*, published in London in 1951, cites two of them to support his contention that Racine is untranslatable.

Since she does not amplify this remark, I can only infer her meaning: Racine is translatable and only an unfortunate theory of tragedy has inhibited the production of an adequate English version. Perhaps so. But she scarcely demolishes the traditional theory that the mere subtlety of Racine makes excessive demands on the ability of a translator.

In establishing the inadequacy of the early translations and adaptations, Miss Wheatley belabors her points unnecessarily. Such detailed demonstrations as she presents are not necessary to show that the adapters produced plays in which Racine's distinctive accomplishment is lost—nor even to show how it is lost. Nearly all of the English adaptations are the subject of separate chapters, some of long chapters. In them appears a series of passages devoted to a contrast of the dramatic dialogue of Racine, one of the three or four supreme European dramatists, with that of English dramatists most of whom do not deserve even the term "mediocre." Of the English adapters of Racine, only Otway and Congreve were men of high ability—ones whose work could be presumed to repay close analysis. The others were men of slender talent and in some instances—as Miss Wheatley shows us—of slender French. In examining the adaptations in such detail, to be sure, she keeps her larger purpose in mind, employing the adapters' individual derelictions as evidence of English attitudes on dramatic diction, poetic justice, and the psychological interpretation of character. She could have made her points with more economy; yet she makes valid and relevant points.

She is a dependable and perceptive critic of Racine; only rarely does she seem to censure an adapter for not anticipating her reaction to a Racinian phrase. If it is an uneconomical and at times clumsy critical method to approach Racine by way of tenth-rate English dramatists, it is nevertheless a method which yields positive results. Because Racine's excellence lies more in the subtlety and accuracy of the depiction of emotional attitudes than in the portrayal of overt action, the close comparative study of parallel passages in his plays and in those of his adapters—if largely a waste as applied to his adapters—provides a measure of the depth of calculated plan in his dialogue.

This is a book in which are presented new factual discoveries, new critical insights, and an original and largely convincing interpretation of an important subject in literary history. Yet it is a difficult, at times even distasteful, book to read. The fault does not lie primarily in the quality of the prose, which is, despite occasional blemishes, competent, but rather in the author's tone, in her lack of a well-developed sense of relevance, and in her repetitiousness. The book too frequently resembles a prolonged series of scoldings of seventeenth and eighteenth-century adapters and of twentieth-century historians of the drama. Miss Wheatley is frequently sarcastic in discussing the adaptations (cf. pp. 179 and 188). She is gratuitously harsh in her comments on the work of modern scholars who have preceded her in study of the subject (cf. her allusions to the doctoral dissertation of Mrs. Dorothy Canfield Fisher published in 1904, pp. vii and 32 n; and cf. especially her allusion to the work of Dr. Joseph Spies, p. 42 n). She allows irrelevant and thus distracting detail to obscure her argument (cf. the presentation of critical theory in Chapter XI). She is repetitious not only in advancing her thesis but also in presenting evidence (cf. the use on p. 133 and also on p. 184 of a large part of the same quotation). I think this book presents a body of important factual and critical discoveries—but that it does so ungracefully.

Stanford University

JOHN LOFTIS

Gita May, *Diderot et Baudelaire critiques d'art* (Geneva: Droz, and Paris: Minard, 1957. 195 pp.). THIS book's basic material comes from a very plenteous and well-conducted *dépouillement* of the art criticism of Diderot and Baudelaire. Mrs. May has read their *Salons* and other critical writings with great care and no little perspicacity, and has digested them for her readers in an intelligently organized form which includes chapters on generalities, intermediaries, the critics' background in artistic theory and practice, their style, principles, objectives, and implications. In addition to familiarity with the critical texts, Mrs. May has the too unusual virtue of acquaintance-ship with a great many of the art works that they discuss. In short, she has a good command of her subject matter.

She uses it to accomplish two very worthwhile objectives. The first

is the task of exposition and *rapprochement*. Baudelaire was the earliest, as Mrs. May says, to acknowledge parallels between Diderot's criticism and his own; since 1845 many other writers have done so, among the latest and most effective of them being Margaret Gilman and Jean Pommier. Mrs. May is the first to provide exhaustive documentation for these parallels. Having read her book, one can no longer question the existence of a remarkable kinship, and often identity, between the doctrines of the two critics, despite the considerable chronological, philosophical, and temperamental differences between them. These differences also are carefully clarified and defined in this book, by textual examination rather than reliance upon the scholarly or biographical work of others. With respect to the kind and quantity of evidence adduced, and the parallelism that the evidence attests, Mrs. May's study leaves little or nothing to be desired.

The second accomplishment, less significant, perhaps, but nonetheless satisfying, is what Mrs. May calls in her preface the rehabilitation of Diderot as art critic, by which she means the destruction of Brunetière's malicious misrepresentation of Diderot the critic as an erratic, sentimentally moralizing ignoramus in matters artistic, who sought to pervert the latter to the elaboration of his unfortunate philosophy. Notwithstanding the brilliant work of Professors Pommier, Gilman, Belaval, Sezneq, and others, the Brunetière legend still finds believers, certain of whose errors Mrs. May points out. She does so, as she does most things, by means not of oratory but of documents. Within its limitations her work provides an effective refutation of the Brunetière doctrine.

Mrs. May finds the esthetic (not merely literary) validity of Diderot's criticism both in its own nature and in its closeness to the undeniably valid and fertile criticism of Baudelaire. Her examination of Diderot is confined almost exclusively to the principles and practices visible in his critical works and some of his fiction. But, as Mrs. May says in stating the objectives of her study, the many parallels between the two critics "ne prouvent rien si l'on ne tente point d'en trouver les causes profondes dans le tempérament respectif des deux auteurs, dans le contexte général de leurs théories littéraires, ainsi que dans les grands courants idéologiques et esthétiques de leur époque propre" (pp. 2-3). For the "tempérament" she does an excellent job, I think, but her treatment of the theories and currents mentioned is sketchy at best. She quite properly refrains from setting down a systematic study of her authors' "doctrines" (p. 3), which I take to mean their

thought in general. One would scarcely require, for example, a full investigation of Diderot's notion of creative genius; at the same time, an adequate summary of it strikes me as indispensable to this book. Mrs. May not only fails to provide such a summary, but she omits from both text and bibliography any reference to the fullest and most provocative studies of the subject that we have: H. Dieckmann's "Diderot's Conception of Genius" (*JHI*, II [1941]) and M. Gilman's "The Poet According to Diderot" (*RR* [Feb. 1946]).

Again, she tends to dismiss Diderot's writings previous to 1755, including the article "Beau," as merely theoretical disquisitions which would be radically altered and superseded once Diderot became acquainted with art and artists in the flesh. In this, I presume, she is following Jean Thomas' epoch-making *L'Humanisme de Diderot*, but she fails, as M. Thomas does not, to see that, e. g., the preamble to the *Salon* of 1767 represents the rich fruition of the earlier theoretical works, not a radical departure from them. It is evident throughout Mrs. May's work that the profoundly coherent continuity of Diderot's thought, first brought home to us by Thomas and since subscribed to by most Diderot scholars, largely escapes her. Her handling of "ce terme vaste et un peu vague de 'rapports'" (p. 126) may be justified by the article "Beau" read in isolation, but vastness and vagueness are substantially reduced by the memoir on acoustics, the *Lettre sur les sourds*, the Dorval conversations, and the discourse on dramatic poetry; Mrs. May's knowledge of these writings seems extremely superficial.

One must carp also at the chapter on Stendhal and Delacroix as intermediaries. The procedure here follows questionable methods (see, pp. 19-35, a series of rather haphazard text confrontations leading to no particular conclusions; see also p. 27, n. 27) to produce negligible results. The importance of Delacroix is asserted, but hardly shown; that of Stendhal is virtually denied. As it stands, this chapter has little bearing on the rest of the book.

At a time when many students of the 18th century are debating the charge that their field produces too much "scholarship" and not enough "literary" work, Mrs. May's study appears as an example of a good "literary" evaluation which would have been greatly strengthened by a sufficiently broad "scholarly" preparation. As it is, Mrs. May is at her excellent best in her very interesting chapters on the artistic backgrounds of Diderot and Baudelaire (III), their styles (V), and their criticism of genre painting (VII). In these,

as more generally in her close reading and judicious *rapprochements* of poet and *philosophe*, she makes a very creditable contribution to our appreciation of two critics of sovereign importance, each of whom "a rédigé ses comptes rendus à un tournant décisif de l'histoire de l'art" (p. 153).

Ohio State University

JAMES DOOLITTLE

W. T. Bandy and Claude Pichois, eds., *Baudelaire devant ses contemporains* (Monaco: Editions du Rocher, 1957. 347 pp.). THE present work differs from Professor Bandy's *Baudelaire judged by his Contemporaries* in one essential respect: purely literary judgments are not included. A series of portraits, silhouettes and anecdotes deal with the many aspects of Baudelaire's personality, with his reactions in the various circumstances of social life. "Regarder écrire ceux qui avaient regardé vivre Baudelaire, telle fut notre loi." This law has been scrupulously observed and the editors have been rewarded with a fascinating and extremely coherent volume, well worth a dozen biographies. Many of these *témoignages*, of course, are incompetent, narrow, envious, biased. But a literary providence is at work which punishes meanness and prejudice, in whatever degree, with a corresponding amount of platitudes, syntactic weaknesses and even spelling mistakes. Were the reader's innocence so extreme, or his attention so lax, as to let some enemy of Baudelaire get away with an Edgar Poë instead of Edgar Poe, he would be quickly reminded of his obligation by a vibrant *sic* of the vigilant editors. Just as Zacharias was struck dumb for disbelieving the message of the Lord, Baudelaire's contemporaries—including Sainte-Beuve—were deprived of their orthography for ignoring the genius of their poet.

All in all, the message of these contemporaries is a useful one. It reveals, once more, that the *poète maudit* persecuted by the Philistines is also a precursor of the surrealists, both more successful than most at eliciting from his bourgeois neighbors the prud'homesque thunders of moralistic indignation and more *engagé* in the affair than he would like us to believe. It is this obvious *engagement* which is somewhat disturbing. We shall be told again that this Baudelaire is not important. We should prefer to know why *this* Baudelaire was *also* a great poet. In the present state of criticism the encounter makes us feel uneasy. Ours is the anguish of the faithful who have long adored

in *absentia* and are now face to face with the prophet. There is a harsh but necessary critical lesson in a pilgrimage to Baudelaire's own country. It reveals how much hagiography, especially *satanic* hagiography, still passes for biography. Those who have not succumbed to this modern temptation have often rejected the "social masks" of the poet as irrelevant to his poetry. But the notion of a truly solitary and poetic self, absolutely independent from these "masks" is no longer tenable. The real basis for an interpretation of Baudelaire might rather be found in Kafka's remarks about his own life "in dem Grenzland zwischen Einsamkeit und Gemeinschaft," the borderland between solitude and togetherness. Our present criticism is no more able than Sainte-Beuve's to explore this *Grenzland*. When we do not ignore it completely we turn it into a pretext for dogmatic utterances in the marxist, psychoanalytical or existentialist vein. The little book of Mrs. Bandy and Pichois should do more than many past studies to promote a real understanding of Baudelaire, *the man and his works*.

The Johns Hopkins University

RENÉ GIRARD

Yvette Lourià, *La Convergence stylistique chez Proust* (Geneva: Droz, and Paris: Minard, 1957. 100 pp.). ONE measure of the originality of Marcel Proust's achievement has been the critical insights which careful analysis of seemingly trivial devices of style has yielded. In Jean Mouton's image, the patient study of the author's style leads to the citadel at the heart of his work. The pioneer insights of Leo Spitzer and Charles Du Bos, the more recent studies of Le Bidois, Sayce, Stockwell, Ullman, and Mouton himself have attested the success of this route of attack. Mme Lourià has undertaken the definition and analysis of a stylistic trait frequently remarked but not heretofore systematically pursued. Preliminary to her investigation she has chosen to introduce a new term into the stylistic vocabulary.

Where earlier analysts have seen a phenomenon variously styled enumeration (Mouton), accumulation (Cressot, Remacle), symmetry (Martin and Cressot), parallel construction (Cattaui), or, more narrowly, "la règle des trois adjectifs" (Zaeske), the author has sought to define a less ambiguous term, *convergence*. She limits her attention to "un ensemble d'éléments, composés chacun d'un morphème ou d'un syntagme, et exerçant tous la même fonction grammaticale

par rapport à un 'pivot' commun, autre morphème ou syntagme" (p. 9). *Convergence*, then, is considered grammatically as comparable to "un ensemble de tableaux" (the elements) which are similarly hinged to another "tableau" (the pivot); the concentric structure of the device is emphasized. She distinguishes two forms of the construction, the *convergence* which she calls "évidente," and that which, by virtue of the heterogeneity of the elements or of the syntactic distance she considers "voilée."

The first chapter is devoted to a descriptive study based on the grammatical type of the element, the occurrence of which is statistically analyzed. The scope of the investigation is indicated by the more than 4,600 instances the author discovers in the course of *A la recherche du temps perdu*. She proceeds in the second chapter to consider the influence on his *convergences* of other stylistic techniques used conjointly by Proust. Just as Proust the critic insists on the unity of composition and the rigor of construction, "rigueur inflexible bien que voilée," Mme Louria finds in the interrelations of the other rhetorical devices (polysyndeton, anaphora, syllepsis, anacoluthon, inversion, ellipsis, etc.) with *convergence* a characteristic articulation serving to unify and control the tentacular complexity of the Proustian sentence. Concluding the section of her study which M. Bruneau would somewhat narrowly define as "la stylistique pure," she considers the internal relationships of different *convergences* in a given sentence; combinations classified as *multiple*, *contiguë*, or *emboîtée*, as well as groups of combinations, all contribute to thematic and rhythmic modulation. The richness and complexity of Proust's prose is nowhere more vividly displayed than in the *allongement* of a crucial sentence from *Sodome et Gomorrhe* (SGI, pp. 25-28; *Pléiade* II, pp. 615-18); here an elaborate analogy is controlled by the concentration of no less than sixteen *convergences* totalling seventy-nine discrete elements. A complex algebra of analogous images is exposed; but further, beneath the mainly intellectual problems of subordination and organization lie those questions of balance and rhythm only partly explicated by Mme Louria's method.

While the first three descriptive chapters are essentially concerned with the analysis of that which is pre-literary and pre-aesthetic in one aspect of Proust's style, the author turns, in the fourth and most suggestive chapter, to a consideration of what she calls "le sens profond" of his use of *convergence* in the recomposition of reality. It is here she sees the device assimilated into the individuality of the

Proustian *parole*, into that peculiar concentric character of the things rendered. The dynamism of the device is related to Proust's "syntax of becoming." Just as the elusive *moi* submits to the superimposition of successive states, so the shifting surfaces of things are constantly qualified and requalified; objects acquire dimension not only in body but in time; perceptions glide from object to subject with a mobility suggestive of the flux of Elstir's "métamorphoses." Where Spitzer and Le Bidois have seen inversion as a significant delaying and "essentializing" device, Mme Louria develops, through apt illustration, the successive qualifications of the *convergence* as a means of placing the pivot image in temporal and spacial relief, in the perspective of the novelist's subjectivity.

In the fifth chapter, Mme Louria attempts to compare the peculiar quality of Proust's *convergence* with passages chosen, it seems, at random from a prose gallery ranging from Rabelais to Gide. The analyses suggest, although they do not exploit, the divergent: the restless and chaotic enumeration of the young Gargantua, the hierarchical and deliberately varied ordering of Flaubert's naturalism. Although few will deny her insistent claim of Proust's originality, the author's conclusions from this sampling are perhaps weakened by an uncharacteristic lack of system. One regrets, further, that passages of the early Proust are not examined (ideally, a fragment such as "Rayons de soleil sur un balcon" of the *Contre Sainte-Beuve* later assimilated into *Swann*, or one of the *Pastiches*). Among Proust's acknowledged masters one especially misses the shifting illusions of Saint-Simon, whose stylistic influence on Proust the pasticheur Spitzer has acutely remarked (*Stilstudien*, II, pp. 483-97). Justly, the one English author represented in the gallery is George Eliot (*The Mill on the Floss*, the opening pages of which are so evocative of the overture to *Swann*); serious exception might be taken, however, with the author's characterization of Eliot's method (pp. 88-9). If one more English author might have been included, Walter Pater (rather than, say, Ruskin) would seem to offer a neglected stylistic parallel.

Mme Louria's own prose is at once lucid and free from idiosyncrasy; if she errs occasionally, it seems to be in the direction of an attempt at too nice a precision; thus, her definition of the term "relief" (p. 8, n. 12) leaves one somewhat confused by the introduction of metaphysical presuppositions. General objections to the author's undertaking are not serious. She evidently completed her research before the establishment of the Pléiade text by Clarac and Ferré; but a

sampling of parallel readings fails to reveal any significant variants to invalidate her illustrations. In the general field of grammatical symmetries, the author does not seem to be familiar with the ambitious thesis of Eugène-Louis Martin; neither does a related stylistic study of Proust's sentence-types by Alfons Wegener appear in her bibliography. More generally, she does not choose to consider those striking *convergences* which are deliberately repeated, whether the intent be ironic or poetic, to create a refrain or leitmotif (cf. p. 5, n. 7).

The patience of Mme Louria's labors not only has contributed a new and valuable term to the critical lexicon, but has afforded a fresh approach through one aspect of his form to the interior of Proust's vision. In the words of Mme de Staël, "le style ne consiste point seulement dans les tournures grammaticales: il tient au fond des idées, à la nature des esprits; il n'est point une simple forme."

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RICHARD MACKSEY

S. Ullman, *Style in the French Novel* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. vii + 273 pp. \$7.00). THE general characteristics of Professor Ullmann's book are these: it is thoroughly informed, its style is clear and agreeable, and it is unpretentiously conclusive in a domain where conclusion is difficult to reach and never passes uncontested.

The Introduction reviews the field of modern stylistic studies, describing, on the one hand, the principal techniques and objectives of descriptive and historical stylistics (which are applicable not only to *belles lettres* but to all types of linguistic expression) and on the other, the intuitive and perhaps more subjective techniques employed by such innovators as Leo Spitzer and Dámaso Alonso in the critical analysis of literary texts. This part of Professor Ullmann's work will be particularly appreciated by readers who, like myself, possess only imperfect and unordered notions of what is implied in the term stylistics. For the author, this introduction serves the more immediate purpose of defining his own position, which, not unexpectedly, is said to "have affinities with both of the main branches." There is no attempt at a genuine fusion of the two views: Professor Ullmann's method is rather an application of certain techniques of general descriptive stylistics to specific literary examples. He chooses as

specimens some two dozen complete novels by seventeen French writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the course of his investigation is governed by his intention to illustrate three features of the stylistic evolution of the modern French novel: the enrichment of vocabulary by the Romantics, the syntactical reforms initiated by Flaubert and continued by the Goncourt brothers, the Symbolists, and Proust, and the emergence of imagery as the creative principle in contemporary fiction. Any feeling of contradiction that one may experience in seeing such an abundance of textual material subjected to so limited a scrutiny is to be corrected by the reflection that it is always thus with essentially historical studies. The author of *Style in the French Novel* is concerned primarily with illustrating a thesis in the realm of *historical linguistics*.

The six essays which comprise the body of the work are: I. Some Romantic experiments in local colour (foreign, archaic, underworld, and peasant vocabulary in Stendhal, Mérimée, Vigny, Hugo, Balzac, and George Sand), II. Reported speech and internal monologue in Flaubert (the origin and development of the *style indirect libre*), III. New patterns of sentence-structure in the Goncourts (the so-called "nominal syntax"), IV. Word order as a device of style (examples from Chateaubriand, Stendhal, Hugo, Balzac, Flaubert, the Goncourts, Gide, Giraudoux, Mauriac, Proust, Romain, Sartre), V. Transposition of sensations in Proust's imagery ("synaesthesia"), VI. The image in the modern novel (Giono, Hervé Bazin, Sartre).

I suspect that many readers will experience, as I have, mixed reactions to these essays. Even though one admit the necessity of quantitative determinations, there is something inevitably dull about accumulations of linguistic samples which are intended primarily to establish the range and frequency of particular stylistic features. Then too, the nature of the exercise tends to exaggerate weaknesses. The vague distaste that one may have felt before the exuberance of Proust's sensory imagery or the nominal constructions of the Goncourts is likely to turn into something approaching revulsion as it becomes evident that these highly individualized modes of thought and expression are also unshakable mannerisms. On the other hand, certain devices stand up very well under the narrow scrutiny of stylistic analysis. The free indirect style of Flaubert, for example, gains force through repetition, perhaps because its function in the novel is constant. Whatever serves to establish and maintain the relationship between the narrator and his vision is of necessity more vital

and fundamental than that which lends tone and color to his account. Imagery that is unified and that serves to reflect a more or less coherent body of notions about the human situation—such as we encounter in the essays on Giono and Sartre—not only bears quantitative measurement and isolated consideration but discloses thereby positive values that might otherwise have been less apparent.

No one is, I am sure, more aware than Professor Ullmann that his book reveals certain incompatibilities between the aims and techniques of descriptive and historical stylistics and those of literary criticism. He is to be congratulated none the less for these eminently practical essays which indicate, in some sense, the limits of expectation in the discipline he is expounding.

Duke University

THOMAS H. CORDLE

Georg Büchner, *La Mort de Danton*, with text, sources, manuscript corrections, transl. & ed. Richard Thieberger (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1953. 224 pp. *Travaux et Memoires des Instituts Français en Allemagne*). IN 1954 Margaret Jacobs published an English critical edition of Büchner's *Dantons Tod* which received two excellent notices, one by William McClain (*GQ*, 1955, vol. 28, pp. 295-96) and one by me (*GR*, 1956, vol. 31, pp. 153-54). The book under discussion is another critical edition of *Dantons Tod*, appearing in France, and antedating the Jacobs' text by one year. American scholarship has not yet evaluated it.

The editor is an *agrégé de l'université* and a Ph. D. from the University of Vienna; in 1937 he translated into French a work of Oskar Jelinek's and in 1952 wrote an introduction to that author's German poems and tales; in 1938 he adapted and translated Büchner's *Dantons Tod* into French for the *Radiodiffusion Française*. The printed version in this volume, dedicated to the late scholar Ernest Tonnelat, is a revised and complete translation of the 1938 adaptation. In 1952 he collaborated in the adaptation and French translation from the German of Fritz Hochwälder's play, and he wrote a study in German on "Time in the Works of Thomas Mann" in 1953. This is the literary, linguistic, and scholarly background which Dr. Thieberger brings to his present task.

The Thieberger volume is a miscellany of many things, some more valuable than others, with much important information for the Büchner

specialist. Thieberger apparently edited the *Dantons Tod* to stir the interest of the French literary public in this German dramatic treatment of the famous French Revolutionary hero. This could account in part for a number of the following short discussions: *Vie de Büchner* (pp. 15-20), *Genèse de la pièce* (pp. 21-23), *Danton héros tragique?* (pp. 24-27), *Tragédie du peuple ou fresque historique?* (pp. 28-29), *Carrière de la pièce* (pp. 30-31), *Büchner en France* (p. 32), *Les sources* (pp. 33-34), *Texte des sources* (pp. 35-52), *Infidélités aux sources* (pp. 53-56), *Les corrections manuscrites* (pp. 57-60), *Texte des corrections* (pp. 61-67), *Etablissement du texte* (pp. 68-70), *Notes* (pp. 139-48) in French to the complete *Dantons Tod* (pp. 71-138) in German and in Roman font, *Répartition des répliques* (pp. 218-20), *Liste des illustrations* (p. 281) interwoven throughout the book and consisting of eight facsimiles and five illustrations, *Notice bibliographique* (p. 222), and *Errata* (pp. 223-24).

Dr. Thieberger informs us in the *Avant-propos* (pp. 11-12) of the four-fold reason for his publication. The first concerns the reprinting of the German text of *Dantons Tod* as Fritz Bergemann authoritatively established it, but with slight changes. These changes are based on a careful examination of Büchner's annotations in the two extant copies of the first printed (1835) edition of *Dantons Tod*. Neither Bergemann nor Karl Viëtor knew of the second copy (p. 13). Büchner had given it to his Strasbourg friend Johann Wilhelm Baum and it is now in the possession of Baum's granddaughter, Dr. Harriet Wegener of Hamburg. Thieberger's discovery of this second annotated copy of the first 1835 printed edition of *Dantons Tod* should encourage us to look for additional ones.

His second objective is the reproduction of source material (pp. 35-52), both French and German, used by Büchner for *Dantons Tod*. Viëtor had thoroughly examined this subject in his Büchner research, primarily in a lengthy article appearing in *Euphorion* [1933, vol. 34, pp. 357-79]. I have made no attempt to compare Thieberger with Viëtor. Thieberger skilfully weaves Büchner's source material with the relevant passages in the play and effectively uses consecutive marginal numbers for each speech to clarify his careful analysis, thus allowing easy access in one volume to the original play, its French translation, the German original, and source material.

The third, and *raison d'être* for the publication, is to provide a literary translation of *Dantons Tod* into French (pp. 149-217), to capture the spirit and style of the German original. However, Thie-

berger's translation is not the first. In 1889 there appeared a volume of all of Büchner's works, comprising some four hundred pages, translated, edited, and preceded by a lengthy study (141 pp.) on Büchner by Auguste Dietrich, a pupil of Büchner's younger brother Alexander (the latter had been forced to leave Germany in 1848 and was at one time Professor of Foreign Literature at Valenciennes). Jules Claretie of the French Academy wrote a lengthy preface for it of over twenty pages. The Dietrich translation is based on the Franzos text of 1879 and contains its misreadings and errors. I found a copy of the Dietrich translation nestling in the Princeton University Library. Lack of review space prevents a comparison between the two French translations.

Thieberger's final purpose in publishing this critical edition is the listing of all Büchner's corrections as found in the two extant 1835 copies of *Dantons Tod* published in Frankfort-on-the-Main. In the previously mentioned edition of *Dantons Tod* for English-speaking students, Miss Jacobs tells us (p. 136) that she had adopted three of Thieberger's variants.

My bibliography on Büchner shows that French interest in and appreciation of the German dramatist continues to mount and that the time has come for a detailed study on Büchner's literary reception in France. In this evaluation Thieberger's role as cultural intermediary, through this critical edition and translation into French of *Dantons Tod*, should be a salient one.

Yeshiva University

RALPH P. ROSENBERG

Henry A. Pochmann, *German Culture in America 1600-1900* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1957. xv + 865 pp.). THIS work has been compared to *The German Element in the United States* (1909) by Albert Bernhardt Faust, but any closer examination shows that the two works are incommensurable though certainly complementary. Faust's work has the subtitle "With special reference to its political, moral, social, and educational influence," while Dr. Pochmann stresses "philosophical and literary influences." One would not look in Pochmann for the record of Germans in the U. S. as engineers, scientists or generals nor in Faust for the precise degree of Poe's knowledge of the German language, the influence of Tieck on Hawthorne, or Hegelianism in the St. Louis movement.

Professor Pochmann's book is definitely a *magnum opus*. The text proper covers pages 1-492, the notes 495-799, and the index 803-865. The main divisions are German Thought in America (pp. 1-323) and German Literary Influence (pp. 325-492). In a field so vast it is possible for the reviewer to comment or check on only very few items; however I might state here that in matters where I happen to know the background Professor Pochmann's facts and treatment appear to be definitely sound.

The hitherto prevalent view of the seventeenth century colonial Americans as provincials isolated from the cosmopolitan traditions of the world has undergone a distinct change; for this the author accords credit to the investigations of Professor Harold Jantz on German thought and literature in New England from 1620 to 1820. Another fundamental change stressed in Dr. Pochmann's work is that the recently accepted reinterpretation of American literature proceeds from the presupposition that American letters are the composite result of the interplay between a foreign tradition and a native environment. The relationship of American authors to German works is dealt with in great detail; for example, twenty double column pages are devoted to Poe and twelve to Whitman. In every case the evidence is weighed carefully and exaggerated claims are avoided. Dr. Pochmann rejects definitely the type of writings on German influence in the U. S. which bear the stamp of being nationalistic (issued largely under the Hitler regime—one such work even has the title *Unser Amerika*) and he has little use also for writings best described by the term coined by Marcus Hansen "filiopietistic." However he points out that truly objective studies have been issued by the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, the Pennsylvania German Society, the German-American Historical Society of Illinois, the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland, and of course by numerous academic researchers.

While the opus under discussion is *magnum* it must be used in connection with *The Bibliography of German Culture in America to 1940*, Pochmann and Schultz, University of Wisconsin Press, 1953, 483 pages. Despite all this material Pochman calls attention to various gaps, for example, a comprehensive treatment of the German church in the United States or surveys on German periodicals such as the one prepared by Felix Reichmann on German publications in Baltimore during the last 150 years. One stricture of interest to scholars writing on "influence" is that frequently they are well qualified to deal with the radiating culture but not so well versed in

the receiving culture, e.g. they are experts on Kant and Fichte but not on Emerson and Parker. Pochmann himself is not so handicapped; he is a professor of American literature thoroughly familiar with German culture.

The University of Maryland

A. E. ZUCKER

Comment on Harry Levin's Review of "Literary Criticism: A Short History"

In the course of our 755 pages (390,000 words) Mr. Levin has picked up a small handful of mistakes, which we are glad to learn about. We are now aware of at least a dozen real mistakes in the book and have collected an assortment of about thirty typographical errors, slips of reference, and the like. The number we think regrettable, but in a book of the size which we undertook they come somewhat short of crushing us.

At the same time, we are scarcely ready to recognize an equal expertness in all of Mr. Levin's objections. There are areas where judgment, as well as close reading, is called for.

"Terence," says Mr. Levin, "is misquoted on page 43." This sounds bad. Open to page 43, and you discover the Latin tag *Fortes fortuna juvat*, quoted without reference to Terence or any other source. The earliest extant source is apparently the *Phormio* of Terence (I, 4, 203), where the verb is *adjuvat*. But in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (II, 4, 11) the same form is quoted as a *vetus proverbium*. The younger Pliny (*Letters* VI, xvi) gives "*Fortes Fortuna juvat*." Livy (VIII, xxix, 5) has: "*eventus docuit fortes fortunam juvare*." For several other variations in classical times, consult G. Büchmann, *Geflügelte Worte*, 1937, p. 363.

"When we are told," says Mr. Levin again, "that Johnson's *Preface to Shakespeare* 'defended the "mingled" genre of tragicomedy,' we are being seriously misinformed; for Johnson was concerned with something quite different, the intermingling of comedy with tragedy; here the genres have been blurred together at the moment when they should be most clearly distinguished." This is making much of our failure to provide quotation marks not only for "mingled" but for "tragicomedy." The terms and the meaning are Johnson's. "Tragicomedy" appears twice in *Rambler* 156; and "mingled drama"

appears in both the same *Rambler* and the Shakespeare *Preface*. In the *Preface* Johnson explains very deliberately what he means. "Shakespeare's plays are not in the rigorous and critical sense either tragedies or comedies, but compositions of a distinct kind." "Through all these denominations of the drama [comedy, tragedy, history], Shakespeare's mode of composition is the same; an interchange of seriousness and merriment, by which the mind is softened at one time, and exhilarated at another." These opinions of Johnson were made accessible under alphabetized heads over thirty years ago by Joseph Epes Brown.

Mr. Levin believes that in a short description of *Le Cid*, stressing (as he does not mention) its observance of the pseudo-classic unities, the phrase "remarkably classical play" is used "unhistorically," that it puts an "obstacle in the way of the student's understanding of neo-classicism as a cultural phenomenon." Our phrase occurs in a paragraph (p. 182) which praises the creativity of the French neo-classic spirit, while at the same time poking some fun at its theoretical niceties. Either Mr. Levin believes there should be no more cakes and ale, or he has not been overly concerned about noticing a context.

Mr. Levin assumes, but we do not, that we ought to bow to Miss Tuve about the nature of metaphysical imagery or to Mr. Kermode about "dissociation of sensibility"—in an argument which Mr. Kermode has advanced, as Mr. Levin cleverly puts it, "lately." Mr. Kermode's essays were published at nearly the same moment as our own book (*Kenyon*, Spring, 1957; *Romantic Image*, Routledge, 1957). Again, Mr. Levin is unhappy because we have reserved "chapters of frontal attack for the expressionism of Croce and the psychology of I. A. Richards," while saying considerably less about Sainte-Beuve and Edmund Wilson! "Frontal attack" is hardly the right term. But we would again devote chapters to both Croce and Richards, and for the same reason, that we look on them as more radical and systematic theorists than many other critics whom we have treated more briefly. Mr. Levin thinks that instead of saying that Aristotle's answer to Plato was "poetry as structure," we ought to say that it was a "redefinition of *mimesis* as the relation between art and life." To us, the kind of generality and circularity involved here does not recommend itself as either Aristotelian or very useful to criticism. Art imitates life. Art is mimesis. Or, the relation between art and life is mimesis. Mimesis is the relation between art and life! The reversal adds nothing to an argument that is trying to find out, not primarily what mimesis is, but what art is. We are left grasping a zero. Differences of judgment like these rest in the end on vast

differences in perspective, in sense of proportion, in logic. We will not further multiply the instances.

The most substantial censures which Mr. Levin urges against us concern our omissions—the critics and schools that are slighted or left out. Such deficiencies were the most obvious risks of our undertaking. Some of these reflect the limitations of our learning. Others are due to inadvertence; still others to choices made in the interest of economy and emphasis. It was particularly difficult to choose among our contemporaries.

But surely none of the faults of our book so far named constitutes the most serious ground of Mr. Levin's dislike. This, he makes clear, is no less than a basic difference in critical principle. So difficult a thing as Mr. Levin's critical principle we will certainly not attempt to define here. It is sufficient to argue that, whatever that principle is, it has a closer relation to his idea of what a history of criticism ought to be than his liberal aversion to our own commitment will very well warrant. "Boileau's *Art poétique*," he complains, "figures as a sidelight upon the section discussing Pope's *Essay on Criticism*—whereas these proportions would probably be reversed by a more objective evaluation of the two works." Maybe so. But Mr. Levin, by his own account of himself, ought not to say this; if he himself were writing a history he would have no legitimate way of coping with the recognition. Near the start of his review he writes: "Much of what the earlier critics have written depended upon the imposition of standards which have been rendered obsolete by the very passage of time. Surviving mainly as curious episodes in the history of taste, these are important to Saintsbury and other historians, but have little significance for Wimsatt and Brooks." Here the dark doctrinaire terms are of course imputed to Wimsatt and Brooks. This is Mr. Levin's dramatization of our supposed mind, our idiom. But it is not our idiom. There are no passages in our book that sound that way. Whose idiom is it? Mr. Levin's own idiom, of course. This comes out smartly in his closing paragraph. "The hazard, which is all too rife in graduate schools today, is lest *ex parte* argument be propounded and accepted *ex cathedra*. The wasted effort of so many dead critics, the rigid enforcement of rules based on misunderstanding, the frenzied quibbling over observances which even pedants can no longer explain—if we have taken the trouble to follow the record, it ought to have taught us that dogmatism is suspect. . . ." "Dogmatism," it will be clear from the context of this review, is any doctrine with which Mr. Levin is not in agreement. Mr. Levin's idiom, not

ours. In the course of our *History* we have doubtless exposed a number of critics in their own inadequacies. We have attempted to dispose of none on the charge of "dogmatism." (See, for instance, our way of using the term "dogma" in our chapter on Croce, p. 513.) If we have taken the trouble to follow the record, it ought to have taught us that the use of "dogmatism" as a vehicle of disparagement is always the mark of an attempt to dismiss, without argument, somebody else's doctrine to make way for one's own.

It is not that we object to Mr. Levin's having a point of view. We object only to his supposing either that his is more liberal than our own or that he could write a history of criticism in such an "open-minded" way as to escape using his point of view—and perhaps even betraying it. Such an "open"—such a backboneless—history of criticism has actually never been accomplished. And for a very good reason.

Yale University

W. K. WIMSATT, JR.
CLEANTH BROOKS

Reply to Comment

Criticism of criticism of criticism, as the late H. L. Mencken pointed out, has its law of diminishing returns, which makes me somewhat reluctant to push this argument into yet a fourth stage of abstraction. As I read the rejoinder of Messrs. Wimsatt and Brooks, it strikes me that they have been generous in their quotations from my review—though sometimes unfair to themselves, in citing my descriptive statements or incidental allusions as if these were always intended to be strictures. Between the two documents as they now stand, I am satisfied that the curious reader will be able to arrive at the truth of the matter for himself. I also trust he will form his own impression of the book itself, which I have consistently given credit for being an able presentation of a certain point of view. I am glad that Messrs. Wimsatt and Brooks still feel uncrushed, but surprised and sorry they should have felt that any attempt was being made to crush them. This may be another matter of idiom. Their notion of scanning the critic's choice of words seems to me an excellent way of illustrating some of the differences between what I call "dogmatic" and what they call "liberal" criticism.

Harvard University

HARRY LEVIN

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